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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most visible and hotly debated Japanese trade barri-
ers in the 1990s was the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law ("LSL").1
For years, no list of impediments to Japan's market was complete
without a reference to the LSL. It was a leading topic in bilateral
talks between Japan and the United States under the Structural
Impediments Initiative. The LSL was also a key element in the
U.S.-initiated film dispute in the World Trade Organization
("WTO"). In 1998, with little advance notice, Japan finally repealed
the LSL, and enacted a replacement.
This Article examines the tight control that the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry ("METI")2 has exercised over retail-
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All translations have been verified by the Author and not by the University of
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law.
1 Daikibo kouri tenpo in okeru kourigyou nojigyon kaLsutdou no dzousci ni kansurn
horitsuu [Law Concerning the Adjustment of Retail Business Activities of Large-
Scale Retail Stores], Law No. 109 of 1973 [hereinafter Large Stores Law].
2 Until the central government reorganization took effect on January 6, 2001,
METI was known as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("lfM).
Major Reorganization of Government Agencies Imminent, Cable 8723 from U.S. Em-
bassy, Tokyo, to US. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 5 (Dec. 4, 2000) (on
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ing since Japan's regulation of large stores began in 1937. Unlike
its commanding role in the manufacturing sectors where it aggres-
sively promoted large industrial firms, in the retail sector, METI
has largely imposed regulations at the behest of the politicians. In
particular, the powerful Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") has in-
sisted on protecting small retailers, who represent one of its most
important constituencies. When called upon by the politicians to
regulate large retail entities, METI responded forcefully, with
regulations that curtailed the opening and operations of large
stores. While METI has willingly imposed restrictions on large
stores, it often delegates the responsibility of regulating these large
stores to others. For years, METI effectively delegated its regula-
tory authority to small retailers themselves. The Ministry has
shunned direct involvement in the messy and thankless task of
balancing the competing interests of small retailers and large
stores.
METI has demonstrated that it can act "with dispatch" when
necessary "to retrieve authority and impose its own will on the
distribution sector."3 In the late 1990s, METI acted decisively and
swiftly when it feared that the LSL might be found to violate Ja-
pan's WTO commitments. Almost singlehandedly, METI orches-
trated the repeal of LSL and the enactment of the Store Location
Law ("SLL")4 It developed the framework for the new regime and
took responsibility for all the important implementing measures.
As the initiator of the new policy, METI persuaded the ruling LDP
and small retailers to accept it by developing an incentive package
aimed at small retailers. This incentive package included funds for
the revitalization of downtown shopping areas and authority for
local governments to develop zones from which large stores could
be excluded.
file with author) [hereinafter Cable 8723, Dec. 4, 2000]. MITI was established in
1949 "essentially" as the result of a merger of the Ministry of Commerce and In-
dustry ("MCI") and the Board of Trade. Tsushou Sangyou Shou Setchi Hou [MITI
Establishment Law], Law No. 102 of 1949; see CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE
JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POUCY, 1925-1975, at 134 (1982).
MCI was established in 1925. Id. at 29. Throughout this Article, METI will be
used to refer to actions of the current ministry as well as its predecessors.
3 Gary D. Allinson, Citizenship, Fragmentation, and the Negotiated Polity, in
POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 47 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasunori
Sone eds., 1993).
4 Daikibo Kouri Tempo Ricchi Hou [Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law], Law
No. 91 of 1998 [hereinafter Store Location Law].
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The new METI-designed SLL gives local governments the pri-
mary responsibility for the regulation of large stores, subject to im-
portant constraints.5 The new regime shifts the basis for store
regulation from protecting small retailers to preserving the physi-
cal environment surrounding new stores. On its face, the SLL ap-
pears to represent a liberalization of large store regulation. How-
ever, given the history of store regulation, there is considerable
skepticism and fear that the new system may be more onerous and
costly than was the LSL. Whether the new regime acts as a liber-
alizing or conserving force will depend, at least in part, on the in-
terests that METI believes must be promoted; that is, large stores or
small stores, respectively. This issue will not be resolved in a po-
litical vacuum as long as the small retail sector remains an impor-
tant constituency of the ruling LDP.
This Article is divided into five parts. Section 2 examines
METI's regulation of large stores from its beginning in 1937
through the last half of the twentieth century. It illustrates how
METI yielded to political demands for protection of small retailers,
first from department stores and then from large-scale retail stores.
METI's response led it to impose increasingly stringent regulations
on large stores as it tailored the regulatory regime to meet the de-
mands of the politically important small retailers.
Section 3 examines METI's response to foreign pressure
(gaiatsu), especially from the United States, to liberalize large store
regulations. In particular, it considers the role of both the United
States-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative ("S1") and a case
filed by the United States in the WTO in regard to the liberalization
of large store regulation.
Section 4 traces METI's response to the fear of an adverse
finding by a WTO panel. It details how METI masterminded the
repeal of the LSL and the enactment of its replacement and con-
trolled the development of the new store regime from beginning to
end. This Section describes the provisions of the new SLL, as well
as the measures that METI has put in place to implement it It also
considers the constraints on local governments and weighs their
potential effectiveness. The conclusion arrived upon in this Article
is that the new regime seems, at best, to be only a modest im-
provement over the old system. At worst, it may impose a far
5 See id.
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more onerous, costly, and less predictable burden on large retail-
ers.
2. METI's REGULATION OF LARGE STORES
2.1. Political Basis for the Regulation of Large Stores in Japan
To understand METI's regulation of large stores over the past
sixty years, one must begin with the relationships among small
retailers, 6 politicians, and the Ministry. Japan has been described
as "a land of farmers and small business operators, where [the
ruling] LDP politicians find their strongest support."7 Within the
small business community, small retailers are an important politi-
cal constituency due to their numbers and their influence in the lo-
cal community.8 They account for fifty-five percent of employment
in the retail industry in Japan (which in turn accounts for twelve
percent of Japan's total employment and five percent of its gross
domestic product), according to a recent study by the McKinsey
Global Institute ("McKinsey Study").9
As the "backbone of the Japanese neighborhood" and an im-
portant and predictable source of votes for the LDP, small retailers
are assured of the politician's ear.10 They have been very success-
ful in translating their political support into protection from their
large competitors. A measure of their success has been their sur-
vival even though they are "extremely unproductive" (nineteen
percent of that of the United States), according to the McKinsey
Study." METI and its predecessors repeatedly imposed regula-
tions on large stores in response to political demands for protection
6 MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, WHY THE JAPANESE ECONOMY Is NOT GROWING:
MICRO BARRIERS TO PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH, ch. 4, at 1 (July 2000) [hereinafter
MCKINSEY STUDY], available at http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi.html. Small retail-
ers are typically "mom and pop" stores found in town centers (shotengai)
throughout Japan. Id. They are usually family-owned and employ two to three
family members. Id. ch. 4, at 4.
7 Aurelia George Mulgan, Japan: A Setting Sun? FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug.
2000, at 40, 42.
8 See Stephanie Strom, As Japan Deregulates, Quality-of-Life Laments: Mom and
Pop Do Battle with Discounters, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2000, at CIO.
9 McKINSEY STUDY, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 1.
10 Strom, supra note 8, at C10.
11 MCKINSEY STUDY, supra note 6, ch. 4, at 1. The McKinsey Study primarily
attributes the low productivity in the Japanese retail sector to the fact that the
more productive large stores have not replaced small retailers. Id. ch. 4, at 6.
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of small retailers. This type of response has been described by
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth as an "example of the political logic un-
derlying MITI's policies."12
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth challenged the conventional wisdom
that the Japanese bureaucracy is superior to the Diet, the Japanese
parliament, because the bureaucracy develops and drafts most
legislation and exercises broad discretion over its implementa-
tior1 3 Rather than presenting the Diet as a tool of the bureaucracy,
they offer the compelling argument that bureaucrats "faithfully
implement [ruling party] policy preferences" in order to avoid ad-
verse consequences. 4 Politicians "ensure that bureaucrats remain
responsive" through a variety of means.s In the case of store
regulation, that has meant that METI must restrain large retail
stores so as not to unduly threaten the economic well being of
small retailers 6 As long as its small retailer constituency is gener-
ally satisfied with the regulation of large stores, the Diet need not
take action and can leave the regulation to METI.17
Kent Calder has observed that "only rarely have the public
policies of major nations been [so] systematically designed to serve
the interests of small firms," as they are in Japan 8 He points to the
distribution sector as the "most dramatic case in point" of the
Japanese political bias toward small businesses.' 9 The following
Sections examine the measures that METI crafted to protect small
retailers in response to political demands.
2.2. The Department Store Law
In 1937, the Imperial Diet enacted the Department Store Law
("DSL") to respond to calls from small retailers for protection from
12 MARK J. RAzisW'E & FRANcES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POUTICAL
MARKnLACE 129 (1993).
13 Id. at 130.
14 Id. at12-13.
15 Id. at 13 (noting for example that if METI were not responsive to the com-
plaints of small retailers, the Diet could step in and refuse to support legislation
offered by the Ministry or "overturn by statute any regulatory measures" adopted
byMETI).
16 Id. at 130.
17 Id. at 13.
18 KENT CALDER, CRISIS AND COMPENSATION: PUBLIC POLICY AND POLn-ICAL
STABILTY IN JAPAN, 1949-1986, at 312 (1988). For an extensive discussion of Japan's
small business policy, see id. at 312-48.
19 Id. at 326.
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competition from department stores.20 In contrast to its eager em-
brace of regulation of industrial sectors,21 Leonard Schoppa has
noted that MCI "initially opposed" enactment of such a law out of
concern that it would impede modernization of Japan's retail sec-
tor.22 But, when attempts by department stores to self-regulate
failed, he concluded that MCI had "no choice but to insert itself
into the high-stakes battle between small merchants and their new
competitors."23 After two conservative political parties (the Sei-
yuukai and the Minseitou)24 drew up draft legislation, MCI inter-
vened. Following consultations with Nihon shoukoukaigisho (the Ja-
pan Chamber of Commerce and Industry) ("JCCI"),25 MCI drafted
its own legislation, which the Diet subsequently enacted as the
DSL.26 Thus began a pattern that would be repeated over the fol-
lowing sixty years: regulation of large stores in response to the
demands of politicians for protection of an important constituency.
The DSL was repealed in 1947 at the behest of the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Forces during the Allied Occupation of
Japan because it was "inconsistent" with Japan's new Antimonop-
oly Law.27 The DSL was re-enacted in the 1950s when small retail-
ers again demanded protection from competition resulting from
the economic recovery of the 1950s.28 Development of the new
legislation had parallels with preparation of the first DSL in the
1930s. While political parties (this time the Japan Socialist Party
and the Democratic Socialist Party) submitted member bills to the
Diet, it was METI's bill, prepared in consultations with the Indus-
20 CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS? THE RISE OF THE
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 83 (1995); LEONARD J. SCHOPPA, BARGAINING WITH JAPAN
149 (1997); Frank Upham, Privatizing Regulation: The Implementation of the Large-
Scale Retail Stores Law, in POLITICAL DYNAMICS, supra note 3, at 264, 268-69, 285.
21 See generally JOHNSON, MITI, supra note 2 (discussing the political structure
of Japan and its policies).
22 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 149.
23 Id.
24 These were the major prewar political parties. CALDER, supra note 18, at 56.
The Seiyuukai was the dominant conservative political party from its foundation in
1900 until 1940. Id. at 166.
25 The Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry serves as an advocate for
small business. See CALDER, supra note 18, at 338.
26 See Upham, supra note 20, at 268-69.
27 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 149. See also Upham, supra note 20, at 269 (dis-
cussing the history and structure of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law and other
regulations associated with the retail sector).
28 See Upham, supra note 20, at 269.
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trial Rationalization Council (Sangyou gourika shigika), that the
Diet enacted in May 1956 as the DSL.29
With the aim of ensuring business opportunities for small- and
medium-sized retailers by regulating the business operations of
department stores3 0 the DSL prohibited the operation of a "de-
partment store business" with more than 1500 square meters
("m 2") of retail space3l unless the store obtained a permit from
MET32 The Ministry could deny the permit if the department
store would affect the business operations of small- and medium-
sized retailers and pose a significant risk of injuring their inter-
ests.33 The DSL also authorized METI to regulate the dosing time
and number of holidays of department stores. 4 While the DSL
centered regulatory authority in METI, it provided a safety-hatch
for the Ministry. It authorized METI to ask the Department Store
Council (Hyakaten shingika)35 to work with the local Chambers of
Commerce and local retailers to develop an "opinion" for the
Ministry to use in determining whether to issue the permit.25 In
this manner, METI could ensure that local interests had direct in-
put into its determination, and also could diffuse responsibility for
its permit decisions.
Over a fifteen year period, METI used the DSL to roughly bal-
ance the interests of small retailers and department stores. It did
so by "preventing new entrants and guaranteeing the territory of
existing branches," while protecting small merchants from un-
wanted competition.37 In the late 1960s, new superstores (suupaa)
threatened both department stores and small retailers by creating
separate legal entities, each below the DSL's 1500 m2 threshold and
operating on different sales floors of the same building but under a
common corporate identity. In this manner, they evaded applica-
29 Hyakkatenhou [Department Store Law], Law No. 116 of 1956; Upham, supra
note 20, at 269.
3D Department Store Law, Law No. 116 of 1956, art. 1.
31 Id. art.2
32 Id. art. 3.
33 Id. art. 5.
34 Id. art. 8.
3 The DSL provided for the establishment of the Council. Id. arts. 11-16.
36 Id. arts. 5(2), 5(3). The DSL also authorized METI to make recommenda-
tions to department stores to not engage in business operations that could affect
the business operations of small- and medium-sized retailers. Id. art. 9.
37 Upham, supra note 20, at 269.
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tion of the DSL.38 METI addressed the new challenge by resorting
to informal administrative measures in the form of a series of di-
rectives: a 1968 directive mandated that superstores obtain DSL
permits;39 a 1970 directive required large stores to "make appropri-
ate adjustments with the local retailers regarding new store expan-
sion, advertising, bargain sales, number of days closed, and hours
of operation;"40 and a 1972 directive required large stores to respect
local business "customs" and to not "disturb the order in the retail
[market]" by using aggressive sales promotions.41
Despite METI's attempts to rein in superstores through such in-
formal measures, by the 1970s, these stores had "emerged as
among the largest of the retail chains."42 With branches through-
out Japan, the superstores caused turmoil in the retail sector.43 As
a consequence, METI turned to its Industrial Structure Council
(Sangyou Kouzou Shingikai),44 which had played an integral role in
3 See id. at 269-70.
39 Guidance Considering 'Pseudo' Department Stores, Directive No. 941 of
June 7, 1968, cited in WTO Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer
Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, para. 5.296 n.301 (Apr. 3, 1998)
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report].
40 Concerning the Construction and/or Expansion of Specified Stores, Direc-
tive No. 1759 of Sept. 28, 1970, cited in WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para.
5.296 n.302.
41 Concerning the Construction and/or Expansion of Specified Stores, Direc-
tive No. 971 of Oct. 1972, cited in WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.296
n.303.
42 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 149.
43 Id.
44 The Industrial Structure Council is typical of the numerous formal and in-
formal advisory or deliberative councils (shingikat) that the Japanese bureaucracy
uses to develop policy proposals and other measures. See FRANK J. SCHWARTZ,
ADVICE & CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF CONSULTATION IN JAPAN 52-58 (1998). Such
councils are authorized by the National Government Organization Law, which
provides:
Each administrative organ referred to in Article 3 [ministries and agen-
cies] may establish by law or Cabinet Order collegial bodies to be in
charge of deliberation of important matters, review of administrative ap-
peals or other affairs deemed proper to be dealt with by conference of
men of learning and knowledge and the like within the scope of its juris-
diction as provided for by law.
Kokka gyousei soshiki hou [National Government Organization Law], Law No. 120
of 1948, as amended, art. 8. In addition to the formal advisory councils (shingikai),
there are also a number of informal, non-statutory advisory councils. These in-
clude roundtable conferences (kondankai) and study groups (kenkyuukai and ben-
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the formulation of large store policy since its establishment in
1964 5 The Council had formed a Distribution Committee to han-
dle METI requests related to distribution issues, including large
store regulation. The Committee issued nineteen interim reports
between 1964 and 1995.46 In its Tenth Interim Report, the Com-
mittee recommended replacing the DSL with a new law that would
apply to all types of large stores, not just department stores.47
2.3. Large Stores Law
Following the Distribution Committee's recommendation,
METI announced plans to relax large store regulation by replacing
the DSL permit system with a notification system. Under the new
system, stores would be free "in principle" to expand.&4 According
to Schoppa, METI hoped "that the freer competition would lead
stores to modernize and pursue efficiencies." 49 METI had to tem-
per its liberalization plans when its proposals brought "a barrage
of criticism" from small retailers and political parties across the
ideological spectrum, including the ruling LDP.50 Accommodating
the interests of the small retailers was particularly pressing for the
LDP, which was reeling from a December 1972 Lower House elec-
tion "debacle," where it lost seventeen seats to a twenty-four seat
gain by the Communist Party.5 1
As a result of the political intervention, METI modified its large
store reform plans. It formally ratcheted down store regulation
from a permit system to a notification system, but according to
Frank Upham, a leading expert on the LSL, METI and the LDP
promised small and medium retailers "that the notification system
would operate 'just like a permit system" 5 2 METI's regulation
kyoukat), which are established by ministry officials without express statutory
authorization. See SCHWARTZ, supra, at 105-06.
45 WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 2.12. METI established the Indus-
trial Structure Council, comprised of academics and industry representatives, to
"investigate and examine important issues concerning industrial structure," in
response to inquiries by the METI Minister. Id.
46 Id. para. 2.13.
47 INDUSTRIAL STRucTuRE COUNCIL, TENTH INTERIM REFoRT 4, cited in WTO
Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.297.
48 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 149-50.
49 1d.
50 Id. at 150.
51 CALDER, supra note 18, at 344-46.
52 Upham, supra note 20, at 272.
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plans were constrained when, as Schoppa notes, METI "was
forced" to add an adjustment (chousei) process that required large
retailers to adjust their store plans to accommodate the demands of
small retailers5 3 This reform of large store regulation was, ac-
cording to Calder, one of the "most important small business pol-
icy innovations" undertaken by the LDP in the early 1970s crisis
period.5 4
The resulting LSL, or Daitenho,5 enacted in 1973 and made ef-
fective in 1974, represented "very much a compromise" among
competing interests: small retailers, large-scale stores, METI, and
the LDP.56 Upham has described its formal procedures as "simple
and straightforward."5 7 Instead of regulating the type of store, e.g.,
department stores, the new LSL targeted the amount of retail floor
space in a single building, regardless of the legal nature of the
stores that it housed.58 Its purpose was to preserve business op-
portunities for small- and medium-sized retailers though adjust-
ments of the business activities of large stores.5 9 The LSL required
notifications (todokede) to be submitted to METI by developers
wishing to construct a building with more than 1500 m2 of retail
space60 ("Article 3 notification")61 and by prospective retailers of
detailed plans for stores in the building ("Article 5 notification").62
Similar to the role of the Department Store Council under the
DSL, the regional Large-Scale Retail Stores Councils (Daitenslin),
comprised of merchants, consumers, and representatives of the
53 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 150.
54 CALDER, supra note 18, at 344-45. With the large store reform, the LDP was
able to compensate its strategic interest group-the small retailers. Id. at 335-48.
55 Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973.
56 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 150; see also Upham, supra note 20, at 270 (de-
scribing how negotiations from competing interests resulted in significant differ-
ences between LSL and its predecessor law).
57 Upham, supra note 20, at 271. It is not the intention of this Article to de-
scribe all of the formal and informal LSL procedures. For an excellent discussion
of LSL procedures, see id. at 271-79; see also ScHOPPA, supra note 20, at 149-52 (out-
lining the development of the LSL).
58 See Upham, supra note 20, at 270.
59 Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art. 1.
60 The threshold was subsequently reduced to 500 M2 . See infra note 77.
61 Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art. 3.
62 Id. art. 5. Large retailers were also required to notify METI of their closing
hours and number of holidays. Id. art. 9.
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public interest, provided a report to METI on the store proposal.63
If, based upon the Council's report, METI determined that the op-
eration of the new store would have a significant impact on small
and medium retailers, METI could issue a recommendation
(kankoku) that the prospective retailer adjust its plans by delaying
the opening date or reducing floor space, daily hours or annual
days of operation.64 Retailers were not obligated legally to follow
METI's recommendation; and, unlike under the DSL, MEfI could
not prohibit a store from opening.65 However, MEI could convert
its recommendation to an order (neiret) if the developer did not
voluntarily abide by it and if METI determined that, without the
adjustments, there was a risk of severe harm to the small- and me-
dium-sized retail industry.66
In establishing the LSL procedures, Allinson observed that
METI "vacillated." 67 The Ministry "worried about the direct politi-
cal costs it might suffer if it intervened too intimately in such a
controversial policy area."68 Also, METI lacked sufficient person-
nel and resources to become directly involved with all disputes
between large stores and small retailers.69 Moreover, METI did not
cherish the prospects of mediating all the disputes likely to arise
between large stores and small retailers, which was far from its
primary industrial policy responsibilities.70
63 Id. art. 7; see also Upham, supra note 20, at 271 (stating that such persons
had to report to METI before constructing a store with over 1500 m2 of space).
64 Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art. 7; Upham, supra note 20, at 271.
65 ScHoPPA, supra note 20, at 151. Even though it could not prohibit a large
store from opening, Schoppa notes that METI could make "the difference between
profit and loss for developers.. . ." Id. It did so by tightening restrictions on store
openings and dictating adjustments that generally resulted in reduced retail space
and business hours and increased store holidays. Id. at 151, 155. For example,
"MI could force a store near a train station to close at 6 p.m., just as commuters
were returning from work. It could also force it to cut the size of its store in half"
Id. at 151.
66 Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art 8. The recommendation that
MEfl was authorized to issue is a form of administrative guidance that is based
on specific statutory language and can be enforced through the issuance of a le-
gally binding order. See Mrrsuo MATSUSHrrA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENr LAW 33-34 (1989) (explaining how the
Japanese system of administrative guides operates).
67 Allinson, supra note 3, at 45.
6S Id.
69 Id.
70 See ScHOPPA, supra note 20, at 151-52.
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METI resolved its dilemma by delegating to local chambers of
commerce the task of working out the settlement of disputes be-
tween store developers and neighboring small retailers.7 It did
this by issuing a directive instructing local Chambers of Commerce
and Industry to establish Commercial Activities Adjustment
Boards comprised of representatives of local retailers, consumers
and academics. 72 These Boards examined whether a new large
store would have an "effect" on local retailers, and then negotiated
necessary changes in the store plans with prospective retailers.
The Boards conveyed their views up the chain-through the
Chambers of Commerce to the Daitenshin and on to METI.73
Through such measures, METI formalized the role of local retailers
in determining adjustments of new stores and, in the words of
Upham, "privatiz[ed] regulation." 74 Upham concluded that, over
the next fifteen years, METI "oversaw the creation of a system that
erected barriers to entry into the retail industry far surpassing
those of the [DSL] in everything but formal legal authority." 75
Only once during the first fifteen years of LSL implementation
did the Diet take formal action to modify the LSL. It acted in order
to halt the evasion of the L.SL by retail chains, which were opening
stores with less than 1500 m2 of retail space.76 In 1978, the Diet
amended the LSL to reduce its threshold to 500 m2 and to give local
governments responsibility for stores with 500 m2 to 1500 m2 of
retail space ("Type I stores"); METI retained authority for stores
exceeding 1500 m2 ("Type I stores").77
71 Id.
72 ScHOPPA, supra note 20, at 152; Upham, supra note 20, at 273-74.
73 Operation of Commerce Adjustment Board, Directive No. 123 of Feb. 28,
1974, cited in WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 5.309; SCHOPPA, supra note 20,
at 152; Upham, supra note 20, at 273-74.
74 Upham, supra note 20, at 264. Eventually, METI would not accept a notifi-
cation unless it was accompanied by a document setting forth the conditions un-
der which the local merchants agreed to the new store's opening. Id. at 274.
75 Upham, supra note 20, at 272.
76 Id. The Diet passed a resolution in 1977 that called for action to protect
small retailers who complained that nearly 1500 new stores were opened in the
first five years of operation of the Large Stores Law. Id.
77 Partial Revision of the Law Pertaining to the Adjustment of Business Ac-
tivities of Large-Scale Retail Stores, Law No. 105 of 1978, cited in WTO Panel Re-
port, supra note 39, para. 5.309, n.313; see also Upham, supra note 20, at 272-73
(stating that, under the revised coverage system, "the former [1500 m2 stores] be-
came 'class one' stores under the direct jurisdiction of MITI; the latter [500 m2
stores] became 'class two' stores under local government jurisdiction"). In 1992,
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By the end of the 1970s, increased store openings coupled with
"sluggish consumer expenditures" had prompted small retailers to
call for a return to the DSL permit systen-7 8 Because seeking Diet
authorization would have generated "substantial opposition,"
Upham points out that METI resorted instead to administrative
guidance/ 9 as it had under the DSL.O In 1982, MEMI instituted a
pre-notification explanation procedure and a pre-notification ad-
justment procedure that effectively circumvented statutory proce-
dures.8 1 The pre-notification explanation procedure required
builders of Type I retail stores and their primary tenants to explain
their plans to local retailers before they were allowed to submit an
Article 3 notification, rather than after, as the LSL intended8 2
Similarly, the pre-notification adjustment procedure allowed the
adjustment process to commence before, rather than after, the Arti-
cle 5 notification, circumventing the four-month statutory limit on
the formal adjustment process.83
Upham has pointed out how METI's use of such administrative
measures distorted the statutory process, distanced ME from its
responsibility to serve as the final decision maker, and turned a
process that was to take only seven or eights months between ini-
tial notification and store opening to one that often took seven or
the dividing line was moved up to 3000 m 2 (6000 m 2 in designated large cities).
WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 2.26.
7s Upham, supra note 20, at 273.
79 Administrative guidance may be generally defined as an informal request
or guidance issued by a government official to a private party asking for specific
action or inaction in order to obtain an administrative objective through voluntary
cooperation. See MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 66, at 31-32. Adminis-
trative guidance can take many forms, including "requests (youbou), directions
(shiji), warnings (keikoku), suggestions (kankoku), and encouragements (kanslzou)."
Id. at 22. For extensive discussions of the origin and use of administrative guid-
ance, see id. at 31-41; JOHNSON, MITI, supra note 2, at 242-74. Administrative guid-
ance was subjected to procedural disciplines for the first time in Japan's Gyous-i
Tetsuuki Hou [Administrative Procedure Law], Law No. 88 of 1993, arts. 32-36.
Lorenz Kodderitzsch, Japan's New Administrative Procedure Lao: Reasons for Its En-
actment and Likely Implications, 24 LAW IN JAPAN 105,126 (1991).
so Upham, supra note 20, at 273.
81 Immediate Measures Regarding Notification to Establish Large Scale Retail
Stores, Directive No. 36 of 1982, cited in WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, paras.
2.29,5.314 n.316. The Directive was revoked in 1992. Id. para. 2.29.
82 WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 2.29; Upham, supra note 20, at 273.
83 Upham, supra note 20, at 273.
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eight years.84 There were even occasional "delays of ten years."85
Nonetheless, METI's regulation of large stores under the LSL was,
under the Ramseyer and Rosenbluth thesis, "fully consistent with
what one would expect of regulation by an elite bureaucracy
regulating the market in the LDP's electoral interest,"86 even if it
did not meet, in Upham's words, the expectations of a bureaucracy
"regulating the market in the national interest."'87
By the mid-1980s, METI's regulation of large stores was under
attack from a variety of sources. Large stores "complain[ed] about
the arbitrary and often extended prior adjustment process" and
small retailers were unhappy with the continuing expansion of
large stores.88 Also, local governments were adopting ordinances
that were stricter than central government regulation.8 9 Schoppa
noted that a series of government-wide advisory councils "pointed
to the Large Store Law as an example of regulatory excess that was
limiting the growth of domestic demand."90 For example, in a 1988
report, the Administrative Reform Promotion Council criticized, as
Schoppa has described, "ITI for letting its administration of the
LSL get away from the original purpose of the law."91
Debate on the large store regulation intensified in the mid-
1980s when foreign complaints began to intrude on what had been
predominantly a domestic issue. The LSL moved onto the U.S.-
Japan trade agenda, where it would stay for the next fifteen years.92
The United States raised barriers posed by the LSL for the first time
84 Id. at 274.
85 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 150-51, 151 fig.6.1; Upham, supra note 20, at 271,
273-74.
86 RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 12, at 130.
87 FRANK K. UPHAM, PRIVATIZING REGULATION: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LARGE SCALE RETAIL STORES LAW IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 50 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Ramseyer and Rosenbluth), cited in RAMSEYER &
ROSENBLUTH, supra note 12, at 130.
88 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 152.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 156.
91 Id. Earlier, the Maekawa Commission in its Report to the Prime Minister
called for "streamlining of distribution mechanisms and conducting review of the
various restrictions pertaining to distribution and sales." THE REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY GROUP ON EcoNoMIc STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
HARMONY 10 (Apr. 7,1986).
92 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 160-61.
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in 1985 at U.S.-Japan Trade Committee meetings.93 Beginning in
1986, the United States listed the LSL as a "trade barrier" in its an-
nual report to Congress on foreign trade barriers.9 4
To blunt the domestic and international criticism, MEl con-
vened a Joint Distribution Council (Ryuutsuu goudou kaigz), com-
prised of the Distribution Committees of the Industrial Structure
Council and the Small and Medium Enterprises Agency's Policy
Council.95 Schoppa pointed out that the use of the two advisory
councils reflected the division within METI of responsibilities for
the distribution industry that corresponded to the competing inter-
ests of two METI constituencies-large stores and small retailers.
With both sides of the large store debate represented in the Joint
Council, its recommendations would be expected to essentially
balance the competing economic and political interests.97
In June 1989, METI developed a "Vision for the Distribution
Industry in the 1990s," in which it proposed reforms of the retail
regulatory mechanism. These included limiting the "prior expla-
nation" phase of the adjustment process to eight months, setting a
two-year limit on the entire process, and prohibiting local authori-
ties from adopting regulations that were more stringent than the
LSL.9 METI planned to implement these reforms in September
1989 by again resorting to administrative guidance with the issu-
ance of a notification (tsuutatsu). Schoppa concludes that imple-
93 Id. at 160. The U.S.-Japan Trade Committee was an annual discussion of
trade issues by the U.S. and Japanese governments. L. Jerold Adams, Te Law of
United States-Japan Trade Relations, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 38,52 (Apr. 1990).
94 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 160. For example, both the 1936 and 1937 re-
ports criticized the limits on expansion by large retailers as "restrict[ing] US.
manufacturers' distribution options" and thus forcing them "to sell through more
expensive smaller stores or forego the opportunities in certain local markets."
USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 161-62
(1986); USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 193
(1987). Also, in 1986-87, distribution issues in general, and the LSL in particular,
were primary subjects of the US.-Japan "Structural Dialogue." SCHOPPA, supra
note 20, at 160.
95 See SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 156.
96 See id. The Industrial Structure Council's Distribution Subcommittee was
organized by the Distribution Industry Division of METI's Industrial Policy Bu-
reau, which, with its long ties to large retail chains, advocated modernization of
the sector. Id. The other Distribution Subcommittee advised the Small- and Me-
dium-Enterprises Agency, a MErI agency charged with protecting the interests of
small- and medium-sized businesses, including "mom and pop" shops. Id.
97 See id.
93 See id. at 155-57.
20011
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
mentation of the reforms would have represented "a significant
move toward liberalization" of the LSL process.99 However, he
casts doubt on "whether METI could have implemented them
faithfully" given its continued reliance on procedures not set out in
the law, such as the "prior explanation process."100 METI contrib-
uted to such skepticism by stating that its mission continued to be
to "protect local retailers from any potential injuries to their busi-
ness."' 0'
METI's implementation of the "Vision" was cut short when its
plans received an "icy welcome" from two quarters.102 First, the
Ministry of Home Affairs defended the constitutional right of local
governments to adopt "their own ordinances regulating local
commerce." 10 3 Second, the LDP commerce zoku, a group of Diet
members active in small business issues, turned against the "Vi-
sion" after the LDP suffered a major loss in the July 1989 Upper
House election. Rather than further anger the small business
community, already smarting from the introduction of a contro-
versial new consumption tax, the zoku members urged METI to put
the "Vision" on hold.10 4 However, as is discussed in the following
Section, foreign pressure (gaiatsu) intervened to provide METI with
the "cover" it needed to undertake broader reforms of the LSL.
9 Id. at 157.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 157-58.
103 Id. at 157. In the January 2001 central government reorganization, the
Ministry of Home Affairs merged with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions and the Management and Coordination Agency to form the Ministry of
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications. Cable 8723,
Dec. 4,2000, supra note 2, para. 4.
104 See SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 156-58.
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3. METI's LIBERALIZATION OF LARGE STORE REGULATION
3.1. U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative
The U.S.-Japan SI05 was launched in July 1989 to address
structural problems in both Japan and the United States.106 The SI
elevated the LSL to a prominent place on the bilateral trade
agenda. It became, in Schoppa's words, "the most-publicized"
structural impediment.10 7 The United States made abolition of the
LSL one of its central S11 demands. As interim steps, the United
States sought the reduction, to six months, of the period for proc-
essing notifications, permission for large stores to add floor space
for import sales without restrictions, and a prohibition on addi-
tional local governmental restrictions. 3 Schoppa has pointed out
that these were the first specific U.S. demands relating to the
LSL. 09
The United States initially focused its arguments in the SI on
the LSL's negative effects on the expansion of large Japanese retail
stores that sold proportionately more imported goods than smaller
105 JOINT STATEENT BY PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRIME MINISTER UNO ON
EcoNoMIc ISSUES 1 (uly 14, 1989) [hereinafter JOINT STATEENrr]. The United
States had proposed discussions of structural barriers to U.S. exports to Japan on
May 29,1989 in conjunction with its implementation of the "Super 301" provision
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 21 US.C. § 2420 (1994).
The "Super 301" provision required the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), in
1989 and 1990, to identify and initiate Section 301 investigations of priority trade
practices. For a discussion of "Super 301" and the Japanese priority practices
cited by the United States, see Jean Heilman Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open
Japanese Markets to Foreign Firms, 17 N.C. J. INT'L LAW & CO.M.M'L REG. 1 (1992). For
excellent discussions of SII generally and the treatment of the LSL under SHI, see
SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 49-85,146-80.
105 JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 105. Under SII, the United States sought re-
forms in Japan's savings and investment patterns, land policy, distribution system
(which encompassed the LSL), exclusionary business practices, keiretlsu groups,
and pricing mechanisms. JOINT REPORT OF THE US.-JAPAN WoRaRIN GROUP ON THE
STRUCTURAL IMPEDmENTS INITIATIVE 2 (June 28, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 JOINT
REPORT]; USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE BRIEFs 107
(1990). Japan, for its part, identified seven US. issues of interest savings and in-
vestment, government regulations, corporate investment activities, corporate be-
havior, export promotion, research and development, and worlkforce education
and training. 1990 JoINT REPORT, supra, at 1-30. Schoppa observed that "neither
side treated them with anything like the seriousness with which the American
demands were treated." SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 85 n.104.
107 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 147.
103 See id. at 163.
109 See id. at 160.
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stores. The basic U.S. contention was "[s]ince larger retailers are
usually more willing to risk introducing new products or aggres-
sively promote imported product lines, limits on retail expansion
effectively hinder the import of U.S. goods."11 0 The United States
expanded its requests to include a market access argument when a
major U.S. retail chain, Toys "R" Us, expressed its interest in en-
tering the Japanese market with plans to open 100 stores."1
In Sil debates on the LSL, METI vigorously defended the LSL
and refused to abolish it. At the same time, METI acceded to re-
quests to liberalize the LSL process and took advantage of the SII
process to implement several large store regulatory reforms that it
had wanted to take under its "Distribution Vision." In the June
1990 SII report, the Japanese government set out a three-phase lib-
eralization plan to, inter alia, "enhance the vitality of the distribu-
tion industry and to ensure smooth procedures for opening new
stores."112 Schoppa said the results "promised to open the door
much wider to large store expansion."" 3
METI carried out the first phase of the 51 reforms by issuing
new administrative guidance to shorten the time for the adjust-
ment process to eighteen months, exempt the addition of 100 m2 of
retail space for import sales from the adjustment process, relax
closing hours requiring notification from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.,
and slightly reduce the number of business holidays required of
large stores (from "less than four days a month" to forty-four days
a year)." 4 Implementation of phase two required the Diet to
amend the LSL. It reduced the adjustment period to one year and
enhanced "the clarity and transparency" of the adjustment process
by abolishing the Commercial Activities Adjustment Boards." 5
110 USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 113-
14 (1989); see also SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 161-62 (explaining how the barriers
that Toys "R" Us faced, as the first large American retailer seeking to enter the
Japanese market, allowed the United States to finally make a direct argument that
LSL blocked American retailers); Upham, supra note 20, at 267 (describing how
Toys "R" Us' interest in direct participation in the Japanese market allowed the
U.S. requests to include pressure on Japan to lift the LSL's barrier on the entry of
foreign retailers into Japan).
111 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 161-62, 90; Upham, supra note 20, at 267.
112 1990 JOINT REPORT, supra note 106, at 111-5.
113 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 164.
114 See 1990 JOINT REPORT, supra note 106, at 111-5, 111-6.
115 Id. at 111-8, 111-9; FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP
ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INmATIVE Sec. III, 3(1) (May 22,1991) [hereinafter
FIRST ANNUAL REPORT]; SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 175 (labeling the abolition of the
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The Large Stores Council was to undertake the adjustment and, if
necessary, request the Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the
Commerce and Industry Association to report local opinions." 6
METI promised in the third phase to review the LSL two years af-
ter implementing the amendments" 7
The 51 liberalization of the LSL was essentially a "win-win" for
both METI and the United States. The SII served METl's interests
by providing the justification for adoption of many of the propos-
als in its 1989 "Distribution Vision.""8 Schoppa has concluded it is
unlikely that METI would have been able to liberalize the LSL in
"the degree that it was or as quickly as it was without gaiatsu (for-
eign pressure)."119 The United States trumpeted LSL reforms as a
major success of the SII process. It pointed in particular to Japan's
reduction of the maximum period for the opening of a new store to
one year, which previously had taken as long as ten years.izO The
United States noted that the 1990 revision of the LSL "has largely
been effective in reducing barriers to the establishment of retail
outlets," even if it had not been successful in persuading Japan to
abolish the LSL.m  Toys "R" Us opened its first store in Japan in
1991 and added seven more stores in 1992.n The toy retailer
opened its 100th store in Japan in December 2000.
"controversial Commercial Activities Adjustment Boards" as "the most far-
reaching change" and noting that the law was implemented on January 1,1992).
The Diet also enacted, in May 1991, the Yunyuuhin senmon uriba hou [Special Law
on Exceptional Measures Concerning Floor Space for Import Sales], exempting
from the adjustment procedures the opening or expansion of up to 1000 m2 of
floor space for import sales in a large-scale retail store. See also FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT, supra Sec. Im, 3(1)(c).
116 FiRSr ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, para. 2(2)(b).
117 See id.
118 See SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 148,155.
119 Id.
120 USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIATE REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 136
(1991); SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 12.
121 USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 162
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 NTE]; SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 166-67. The United
States continued to monitor Japan's implementation of its Sli commitments with
regard to the LSL. USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT OF FOREIGN TRADE
BARRIERs 173 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 NTE].
122 1993 NTE, supra note 121, at 162. By 1992, large stores were opening in
Japan at twice the rate of the latter half of the 1980s. ScIHOPPA, supra note 20, at 90.
123 Interview with Lewis I. Cohen, Toys "R" Us consultant, in Washington,
D.C. (Aug. 14, 2000).
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3.2. U.S.-Japan Deregulation Fora
When a new Administration was inaugurated in Washington
in 1993, METI faced renewed pressure from the United States to
remove remaining restrictions on the operation of large stores. Be-
ginning in 1993, the United States engaged METI in bilateral dis-
cussions of the LSL process under the U.S.-Japan Framework for a
New Economic Partnership ("Framework").124 The bilateral de-
regulation discussions essentially coincided with the Japanese gov-
ernment's establishment of a five-year (Japan Fiscal Year ("JFY")
1995-99) Deregulation Action Program formulated in 1995.125 Be-
ginning in 1997, the United States made LSL reforms a priority un-
der the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Com-
petition Policy ("Enhanced Initiative"). 2 6
In January 1994, the U.S. government asked METI to remove
restrictions on the hours and days of operation of large stores, limit
the discretion of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law Committee
(Daitenshin) to demand reductions in proposed retail areas as a
condition of opening or expanding a store, and streamline the
124 In July 1993, the U.S. President and Japanese Prime Minister agreed to a
Joint Statement on the United States-Japan Framrework for a New Economic Partnership
"as a new mechanism of consultations." JOINT STATEMENT ON THE UNITED STATES-
JAPAN FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (July 10, 1993), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/framework.htm [hereinafter
FRAMEWORK]. It established five areas of sectoral and structural consultations and
negotiations, including Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness, aimed at the
"reform of relevant government laws, regulations, and guidance which have the
effect of substantially impeding market access for competitive foreign goods and
services, including... distribution." Id. at 2; see also 1994 NTE, supra note 121, at
143 (noting that the Framework addressed the issue of regulatory reform and
competitiveness, which was considered a major barrier to entry to the Japanese
market). The distribution issues were taken up in the Deregulation and Competi-
tion Policy Working Group. USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT OF FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS 197 (1995).
125 GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, THE DEREGULATION ACTION PROGRAM (Mar. 31,
1995); see also Text of Five-Year Deregulation Plan Outline (Part 1 & 2), YOMIulRI
SHIMBUN, at 12 (Mar. 29,1995), translated in Cable 3739 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo,
to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Mar. 30,1995) (on file with author). The
Japanese fiscal year is from April 1 through March 31.
126 JOINT STATEMENT ON THE U.S.-JAPAN ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION PoucY UNDER THE U.S.-JAPAN FRAMEWORK FOR A
NEW ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP (June 19, 1997) [hereinafter ENHANCED INITIATIVE]
(stating its purpose "to strengthen the dialogue between and reinforce the efforts
of their governments with regard to deregulation and competition policy").
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store-opening process.127 In response, METI extended the manda-
tory closing time for large stores from 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., re-
duced the minimum number of days each year that a large store
had to dose from forty-four days to twenty-four days, and simpli-
fied the store-opening procedures. 28
In 1995 and 1996, the United States broadened its requests to
include the phaseout of the LSL by the end of JFY 2000 (March 31,
2001) and the prevention of local governments from introducing
new restrictions on large stores. As interim measures, the United
States asked Japan to eliminate all restrictions on existing store op-
erations, including hours of operations and number of days closed,
and to further streamline the store-opening processj29 MEMT re-
sisted further substantive changes, pending the review of the LSL,
that it had promised under the SII of the effects of earlier liberali-
zation. It assigned the task of conducting the review and reporting
during JFY 1997 to the Distribution Subcommittees of MET's In-
dustrial Structure Council and the Small- and Medium-Sized En-
terprise Policy Council.130 The Ministry indicated that, after the
advisory council deliberations, it would review the requests of the
U.S. government, the European Union, and the American Chamber
of Commerce to phase-out or substantially amend the LSL. m
1v U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEREGULATION AND COMPEnTION POUCY WOzixG
GROUP, PROPOSED MEASURES TO BE TAKN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN 22 (Jan. 18,
1994).
12 1994 NTE, supra note 121, at 173. The United States sought further
streamlining of the large store process. Id.; see also SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERN.NT
OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN REGARDING DEREGULATION
AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN JAPAN 9-10 (Nov. 15, 1994) (recommending the
elimination of various restrictions and expediting the processing of large-scale
retail store applications).
129 SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNTrED STATES TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF JAPAN REGARDING DEREGULATION, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND COMPEmTION
PoucY IN JAPAN 12-13 (Nov. 21, 1995); SUBMISSION BY THE GovER r OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE GOVERNiENT OF JAPAN REGARDING DEREGULATION,
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND COMPETITION Poucy IN JAPAN 7-8 (Nov. 15, 1996)
[hereinafter 1996 SUBMSSION]. In 1996, the United States also sought the elimina-
tion of all the LSL adjustment provisions relating to reductions of floorspace of
large stores. Id. at 7.
130 GOJ Deregulation Plan: Hits and Misses II, Cable 4476 from US. Embassy,
Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 4 (May 17, 1996) (on file
with author).
131 GOJ's Revised 3-Year Deregulation Plan: Part 3: Autos/Auto Parls/Aolorcycdes,
Distribution and Import Processing, Cable 3559 from US. Embassy, Tokyo, to US.
Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Apr. 23, 1997) (on file with author); MI1T,
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3.3. U.S.-Japan WFO Film Dispute
3.3.1. Section 301 Case
The United States ratcheted up pressure on METI to abolish the
LSL when it played a new card and took the bilateral debate on the
LSL to the WTO. That case began when the USTR initiated an in-
vestigation under Sections 301-309 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended ("Section 301"),132 of allegations by a U.S. company,
Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak"). Kodak alleged that certain
acts, policies, and practices of the Government of Japan denied ac-
cess to the Japanese market for consumer photographic film and
paper. 33
Upon launching its investigation, the USTR requested consul-
tations with the Japanese government,134 with expectations of ne-
gotiating a solution based upon its prior experience in disputes
with Japan.135 However, this time the Japanese government re-
fused to enter into substantive consultations, much less negotiate a
resolution. Japan asserted that it would "not engage in considera-
tions or negotiations on issues raised in the context of Section
301."136 The Japanese government further contended that Kodak
RESULTS OF REVIEW OF REQUESTS RECEIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL SOURCES (Mar. 31,
1997).
132 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994). Section 301 is the primary authority for the
United States to impose trade sanctions on its trading partners who fail to fulfill
their commitments under trade agreements or who otherwise maintain unreason-
able, discriminatory, or unjustifiable practices that burden or restrict U.S. com-
merce. It has been used principally as leverage to negotiate the removal of trade
barriers. For a more complete description of Section 301, see Grier, supra note 105,
at 4-10.
133 Initiation of Investigation Pursuant to Section 302 Concerning Barriers to
Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 60
Fed. Reg. 35,447 (uly 7, 1995) [hereinafter Initiation of Investigation]. See also
PETITION OF EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY PURSUANT TO SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE
AcT OF 1974, AS AMENDED, FOR RELIEF FROM JAPANESE MARKET BARRIERS IN
CONSUMER PHOTOGRAPHIC FILM AND CONSUMER PHOTOGRAPHIC PAPER 2 (May 18,
1995) [hereinafter KODAK PETITION] (alleging that the acts, policies, and practices
of the Japanese government deprived Kodak of $5.6 billion in revenue since 1975).
134 Initiation of Investigation, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,447 (July 7,1995).
135 See Grier, supra note 105, at 43-44.
136 Letter from Yoshihiro Sakamoto, METI Vice Minister for International Af-
fairs, to Ambassador Ira Shapiro, USTR (Jan. 5, 1996), reprinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 12, 1996, at 22-23 [hereinafter Sakamoto Letter]. This was the first
time Japanese officials refused to negotiate an agreement with the United States.
They would not even participate in informal talks with the U.S. government.
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should have taken its competition-related allegations to the Japan
Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC").137 The United States rejected Ja-
pan's contention that the JFTC handle the matter, pointing out that
"the JFTC has already completed a review of this matter... and
has determined that there is no basis for further investigation."23
Rather, the USTR insisted that METI "must play a central role in
resolving this issue" since it had jurisdiction over the LSL.9
Failing to engage the Japanese government substantively on
the issues, the USTR concluded its Section 301 investigation. 4 0 The
USTR determined that the Japanese government had engaged in
unreasonable practices with respect to the sale and distribution of
consumer photographic materials that burden or restrict U.S.
commerce. 141 Rather than exercising its authority under U.S. law to
impose sanctions' 42 the United States initiated proceedings in the
Richard Katz, Kodak's Moment: Not a Pretty Picture, THE ORIENTAL EcoNOmST, Jan.
1998, at 7. See William H. Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute
Resolution: Lessons Learned from the U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 6 GEO. MAsoN L REV.
459 (1998) for an explanation of the Japanese position. Mr. Barringer represented
Fujifilm, a Japanese firm, in the film dispute.
137 Sakamoto Letter, supra note 136. Kodak alleged that Fujifilm had engaged
in practices that were inconsistent with Japan's Antimonopoly Law, including re-
sale price maintenance, vertical non-price restraints, and refusals to deal KODAK
PETITION, supra note 133, at 5-7; Initiation of Investigation, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,447 (July
7,1995). The basis for this claim was a 1994 amendment of the Section 301 provi-
sions that added as an "unreasonable" foreign government act, policy, or practice
the denial of "fair and equitable market opportunities, including the toleration by
a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or
among enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of restricting, on a
basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United States
goods or services to a foreign market." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
In Letter from Ambassador Ira Shapiro to Yoshihiro Sakamoto, MErI Vice
Minister for International Affairs (dated Dec. 21, 1995), reprinted in Ie-IDE US.
TRADE, Jan. 12,1996, at 23-24.
139 Id&
140 The Section 301 statute requires the conclusion of an investigation within
twelve months of its initiation, unless formal dispute proceedings in a trade
agreement, such as a WTO agreement, have been invoked. 19 US.C. §
2414(a)(2)(B) (1994).
141 Section 304 Determinations: Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,929 (1996); see also USTR,
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIES 208-09 (1996).
142 Where the USTR makes an affirmative determination that acts, policies,
and practices of a foreign government violate or deny US. trade rights or are un-
justifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burden or restrict US. commerce,
and the foreign government does not remove the measure or otherwise reach a
satisfactory resolution with the United States, Section 301 authorizes retaliatory
action. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1) (1994).
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WTO on June 13, 1996. It requested three primary sets of consulta-
tions with the Japanese government.143
One consultation request centered on allegations relating to the
LSL and other Japanese government measures affecting the distri-
bution, offering for sale, and internal sale of imported consumer
photographic film and paper.44 The United States alleged that the
measures violated Japan's obligations under the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") Article Ill (regarding national
treatment obligation) and Article X (regarding publication and
administration of trade regulations), and directly or indirectly nul-
lified and impaired GATT benefits accruing to the United States
under GATT 1994, within the meaning of GATT Article XXIII:I(a)
and (b).145 In a second consultation request, the United States con-
tended that the requirements and operation of the LSL violated the
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS").146 The
Japanese government accepted both consultation requests147 pur-
suant to its obligation under the WTO dispute settlement provi-
sions. 48 When subsequent consultations failed to resolve the is-
143 USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 225-
26 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 NTE].
144 See id.
145 Letter from Booth Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, to Minoru
Endo, Japanese Ambassador to the WTO (June 13, 1996), reprinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 14,1996, at 23; see also Press Statement, USTR, Acting USTR Charlene
Barshefsky Announces Action on Film (June 13, 1996) [hereinafter USTR June 13,
1996 Statement] (announcing the United State's decision to make three requests
for consultation).
146 Letter from Booth Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, to Minoru
Endo, Japanese Ambassador to the WTO (June 13, 1996), reprinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 14, 1996, at 24 [hereinafter First U.S. Request for GATS Consulta-
tions]; see USTR June 13, 1996 Statement, supra note 145. The United States also
requested consultations under a GATT Decision on "Restrictive Business Prac-
tices: Arrangements for Consultations," in order to discuss "business practices
that restrict competition in international trade for consumer photographic film
and paper." Letter from Booth Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, to Minoru
Endo, Japanese Ambassador to the WTO (June 13, 1996), reprinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, June 14,1996, at 24; see USTR June 13,1996 Statement, supra note 145.
147 Letter from Minoru Endo, Japanese Ambassador to the WTO, to Booth
Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO (June 24, 1996) (accepting consultations in
the GATT case) (on file with author).
148 Marraksesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 2, UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETLEMENT OF
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sues 49 the United States requested formation of a WTO panel in
the GATT case.5 0
3.3.2. GATT Case
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") established a panel
on October 16, 1996.151 In the GATT case, the United States argued
that the LSL was one of the "liberalization countermeasures" that
the Japanese government had developed to "thwart foreign access
to its market" to counter the effects of liberalization that Japan had
taken to bring its economy into the global market 52 The United
States contended that Japan had restricted the presence and opera-
tions of large stores by requiring adjustments, such as reducing
floor space, delaying opening, or reducing the days and hours of
operation, in order to ensure that small local retailers would not
oppose the opening or expansion of a large store.'3 According to
the United States, the LSL's restraints on large stores constricted an
important channel to the Japanese market for foreign manufactur-
ers, as large stores are more likely to carry foreign products than
small stores.9 4
The Japanese government countered arguing inter alia, that the
LSL "reflects long-standing Japanese policy... of regulating large
stores to preserve a diversity of small, medium and large retailing
competitors;" the LSL neither regulated the products large retailers
149 Press Statement, USTR, US. to Request WTO Panels on Film and Large
Scale Retail Store Law (Aug. 12, 1996). Under WTO dispute settlement proce-
dures, the United States became eligible on August 12, 1996, sixty days after its
request for consultations, to request a panel. DSU, supra note 148, art. 4 para. 7
(noting that after sixty days the complaining party may request a panel).
150 Letter from Booth Gardner, US. Ambassador to WTO, to Celso Lafer,
Chairman of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Sept. 20,1996); Press Statement,
USTR, United States Requests WTO Panel-Separate GATS Case to Be Expanded
(Sept. 20,1996) [hereinafter USTR Sept. 20,1996 Statement] (noting the U.S. deci-
sion to request a WTO panel).
151 Press Statement, USTR, Background, WTO to Launch Panel on Film Case
(Oct. 15,1996) [hereinafter USTR Oct. 15,1996 Statement]; se WTO Panel Report,
supra note 39, para. 1.2; 1997 NTE, supra note 143, at 225. The European Commu-
nities and Mexico filed as third parties to the dispute. WTO Panel Report, supra
note 39, paras. 1.1-1.4.
152 USTR Oct. 15, 1996 Statement, supra note 151; W1TO Panel Report, supra
note 39, para. 5.219.
153 See USTR Oct. 15,1996 Statement, supra note 151.
154 WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, paras. 5.219-5.223; sac USTR Oct. 15,
1996 Statement, supra note 151 (discussing the protectionist intent of the LSL).
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could carry, nor took into account the products sold by a retailer
"when determining whether and what adjustments are necessary;"
and the LSL had been "significantly liberalized in recent years."155
The WTO panel, in its final report, dated April 3, 1998,156 con-
cluded that "the United States has not demonstrated that the LSL
of 1974, its amendment in 1979, or any implementing regulations
or administrative measures, nullifies or impairs benefits accruing
to the United States within the meaning of Article XXIII:I(b)."157
The United States did not appeal the panel decision to the WTO
Appellate Body. 58 Despite its loss, the United States cited subse-
quent moves by Japan to eliminate the LSL as one of the benefits of
the WTO case. 5 9
3.3.3. WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")
Case
With regard to its GATS case, after the initial set of consulta-
tions on the LSL in July 1996, the United States requested further
consultations with Japan, expanding its request to include other
laws.160 The United States based its GATS consultation requests on
155 WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 10.213.
156 The WTO panel gave its Interim Report only to the U.S. and Japanese gov-
ernments, as the parties to the dispute, on December 5,1997. However, the panel
did not make it available officially until April 3,1998. Interim Report of the Panel
(Dec. 5,1997). WTO panels issue interim reports only to the parties to the dispute.
DSU, supra note 148, art. 15. However, the parties often leak them to the press.
Press Statement, USTR, Statement by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky regarding
the WTO Dispute on Photographic Film and Paper (Dec. 5,1997).
157 WTO Panel Report, supra note 39, para. 10.233.
158 USTR, NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 240
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 NTE]. Under the DSU, parties may appeal "issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel" to a
standing Appellate Body. DSU, supra note 148, art 17. Instead of appealing, the
United States established an interagency monitoring and enforcement committee
to review Japan's implementation of representations that it made to the WTO
panel, including that it "prohibits practices that discourage the opening of large
stores." Press Release, USTR, USTR and Department of Commerce Announce
Next Steps on Improving Access to the Japanese Market for Film (Feb. 3,1998).
159 U.S. GOVERNMENT, ASSESSMENT OF JAPAN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC
REPRESENTATIONS IT MADE TO THE WTO 2 (Aug. 19,1998) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT
OF JAPAN'S IMPLEMENTATION].
160 Letter from Booth Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, to Minoru
Endo, Japanese Ambassador to the WTO (Sept. 20, 1996), repinted in INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 27, 1996, at 5-6; see also USTR Sept. 20, 1996 Statement, supra note 150
("On a separate track, the United States will expand its GATS case.., to shed
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allegations that the Japanese government's application of the LSL
and "related legislation, regulations, and administrative measures"
were inconsistent with several GATS articles, namely Articles IH
(transparency in service measures), VI (domestic regulation), XVI
(market access), and XVII (national treatment) 6 In the consulta-
tions, the United States argued that by limiting the opening of
large stores through the adjustment of large store plans to protect
small retailers, the LSL served as a barrier to market access for film,
as well as other imports.1 62 The United States took no further ac-
tion on the GATS case after the second set of consultations in No-
vember 1996. It neither requested the formation of a WTO panel
nor withdrew the case from the WTO.163
Professor Sara Dillon has concluded that the GATS case was a
"far more powerful argument" than the GATIT non-violation ar-
gument. T The LSL was particularly vulnerable under GATS Arti-
cle XVI, which prohibits measures that limit the "number of service
suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies,
exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economics
needs test"165 as well as "the total quantity of service output ex-
pressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quo-
tas or the requirement of an economic needs test."'66 The impact of
light on measures that impact on the competitiveness of Kodak in the Japanese
market.").
161 First U.S. Request for GATS Consultations, supra note 146.
162 U.S. to Claim Store Law Violates Service Agreement, KYoDO NEVS, Sept. 6,
1996.
163 See Barringer, supra note 136, at 473 ("After a single initial consultation
with the Japanese government the U.S. formally advised the WTO last fall that it
needed to rethink its case.... However, no further action was taken since the
conclusion of those consultations in late 1996.").
164 Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death of Domestic Political Con-
stituencies, 8 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 220 (1999). Dillon asserts that "Under
an agreement reached during preliminary Fuji-Kodak negotiations and outside
the supposedly transparent legalities of the WTO, the US. obtained a Japanese
commitment to abolish the Large Scale Retail Store Law," in exchange for the US.
agreement to not pursue its GATS case. Id. at 199 (emphasis added); see also id.
n.22 (addressing governmental negotiating in the WTO context). While Dillon of-
fers an interesting thesis, the support she cites does not provide any evidence of
such an agreement between the two countries. Moreover, the subsequent ex-
changes between the United States and Japan contradict that thesis. Dillon con-
cludes that the Japanese government sold out its small business interests by
agreeing to abolish the LSL in light of the strong possibility that a WTO panel
would likely find that the law violated GATS. Id. at 200 n.7.
165 WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services, art XVI(2)(a).
166 Id. art. XVI(2)(c).
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the U.S. initiation of the GATS case on Japan's decisionmaking re-
garding the future of large store regulation is examined below.
4. METI's DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LARGE STORE REGULATORY
REGIMES
4.1. Preparations for a New Regulatonj Regime for Large Stores
4.1.1. Joint Distribution Council
While the LSL was under international scrutiny at the WTO,
METI laid the groundwork for a new regulatory regime. In May of
1997, the Ministry once again convened the Joint Distribution
Council to conduct deliberations on the future of the LSL and other
retail distribution issues.1 67 Nearly half of the thirty-eight member
Council was made up of representatives of organizations across the
spectrum of retail interests.168 METI did not allow the Council to
develop a new large store regulatory policy on its own. Rather,
METI exercised firm control of the Council to ensure that its rec-
ommendations were consistent with the Ministry's plans. Such ac-
tions substantiated frequently heard criticism that advisory coun-
cils often serve as little more than "rubber-stamps" for policy
decisions of ministries and that they "cloak" non-transparent, bu-
167 See KodakAVTO/GATS: MITI Gives Us Another Run-Around on the Large Re-
tail Store Law, Cable 5348 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash, D.C., para. 7 (une 19,1997) [hereinafter Cable 5348, June 19,1997] (on file
with author).
168 See Kodak/WTO/GATS: MITI Convenes Advisory Committee to Review Large
Retail Store Law, Cable 5748 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Wash., D.C., para. 9, tbl.1 (July 2, 1997) [hereinafter Cable 5748, July 2,
1997] (on file with author). Retail-related organizations represented on the Coun-
cil included the National Federation of Shopping Center Promotion Associations
(Zenkoku Shoutengai Shinkou Kumiai Rengoukai), the Japan Franchise Association
(Nihon Franchise Chain Kyokai), Japan Voluntary Chainstore Association (Nihon
Voluntary Chain Kyokai), National Federation of Small and Medium Enterprise
Business Associations (Zenkoku Chusho Kigyo Dantai ChuokaO, Japan Department
Store Association (Nihon Hyakkaten Kyokai), Small and Medium Enterprise Indus-
try Association (Chusho Kigyo Jigyodan), Japan Chainstore Association (Nihon
Chainstore Kyokaz), Japan Federation of Societies of Commerce and Industry (Zen-
koku Shokokai Rengokai), Japan Speciality Stores Association (Nihon Senmonten Kyo-
kai), Japan Retailing Federation (Zenkoku Kouri Shijo So-Rengokai), Japan Council of
Shopping Centers (Nihon Shopping Center Kyokai), and the Japan Chamber of
Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho). Id.
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reaucracy-led, decision-making processes in an aura of independ-
ence and impartiality.169
At the Joint Council's first substantive meeting on June 19,
1997, METI largely controlled the meeting's agenda, presentations
to the Council, interaction among the members, and information
provided to themj 7 In directing the conduct of the meeting, M=
"essentially reduc[ed] the [Council] to spectator status."17' In ad-
dition, the presence of approximately thirty METI officials at the
meeting reportedly discouraged any real deliberation by the mem-
bers. 72 The meeting was largely devoted to presentations by =ETI
and local governments "on the bleak future of Japanese small re-
tailers."" 3 Two of the five members allowed to speak during
twenty minutes of "free time" were representatives of small busi-
ness associations (JCCI and the National Federation of Shopping
Center Promotion Associations). They criticized further deregula-
tion of the LSL. 74
169 Id. para. 2; see also Advisory Councils: Responsibility md Personnel Selection
Unclear, YoNumRI SHImBUN, June 6, 1996, translated in Cable 5770 from U.S. Em-
bassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., Uune 24,1996) (on file with
author) (discussing how the current operation of advisory councils has been
called into question with respect to, for example, their decision-making process
and appointnent of former government agency officials to posts in advisory
councils, despite the fact that such actions are prohibited); Eiko Oya, TMe Failings
of the Government's Advisory Councils, JAPAN ECHO, Autumn 1996, at 15, 17 (dis-
cussing the view that the ministries decide what policies they want to promote
and then bring in the councils to endorse their position in an effort to create the
impression that they are responsive to the nation's interests).
170 See Cable 5748, July 2,1997, supra note 168, paras. 2,9,24. In what the US.
Embassy termed "an unusual move", METI allowed approximately seventy
members of the public (selected by lottery) to attend the Council's June 1997
meeting as observers, including an economic officer from the US. Embassy. Id.
para. 3.
171 Id. para. 4.
172 Id. para. 5. METI officials also served as the secretariat of the Council, as is
typical of Japanese advisory councils. Id.
17 Id. para. 4. METI officials from the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency
pointed out that, since 1982, the number of retailers with less than four employees
had dropped from 1A million to 1.1 million. They also observed that the profit
margins of small- and medium-sized retail stores had eroded due to "such factors
as local economic stagnation... and inefficient business practices." Id. para. 8.
174 Id. paras. 4, 6, 7. The JCCI President contended that deregulation of the
LSL had led to the dosing of 8000 small stores each year since 1990. Id. para. 6.
The JCCI is comprised of more than 2800 chapters, representing over one million
members. Id. para. 7.
2001]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
In October 1997, METI took steps to counter opposition to re-
form that had been expressed within the Council. The Ministry ar-
ranged for opinions from both domestic and international advo-
cates for the repeal of the LSL to be recorded in the Council
minutes.175 METI asked the Council representatives of two indus-
try associations, the Japan Chain Stores Association ("JSCA")176
and Keidanren, to make submissions to the Council urging repeal
of the LSL.17' At the Council's October 27 meeting, in accordance
with METIs script, the Keidanren representative called for repeal
of the LSL. In addition, Keidanren urged elimination of other de-
mand and supply control mechanisms, noting that METI had
promised the Commission on Administrative Reform that the
Ministry would discontinue such mechanisms. Keidanren further
expressed its concern that local governments might enact stricter
regulations if the LSL was repealed.17
To bring attention to foreign calls for reform, METI also asked
both the U.S. Government and the European Union ("EU") to pres-
ent positions on the LSL at the Council's October meeting.7 9 In its
presentation to the Council, the United States reiterated its advo-
cacy of abolition of the LSL. It contended that "reform of the over-
regulated retail sector could provide significant gains for the Japa-
nese economy by enhancing consumer interests, increasing
efficiency, and promoting economic activity."'180 The United States
reiterated Keidanren's concern that local governments would fill-in
behind the LSL with their own restrictive ordinances.181 It urged
175 The Large-Scale Retail Store Law: Are Its Days Numbered?, Cable 9568 from
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Nov. 4, 1997)
[hereinafter Cable 9568, Nov. 4,1997] (on file with author).
176 METI officials informed the JCSA representative on the Council that the
Ministry had "highly evaluated" the Association's earlier submission advocating
eventual abolition of all LSL restrictions, and asked the JCSA to submit an opinion
paper to the Council on large store regulation. Id. para. 3.
177 METI asked Keidanren to make an unqualified recommendation of repeal
of the LSL, by dropping the condition that it be abolished "in stages," which was
in a submission that Keidanren had made to the Council only one month earlier.
Id.
17 Id.
179 Id. para. 9.
180 MITI Request for U.S. Position on Large Scale Retail Store Law, Cable 200529
from U.S. State Department, to U.S. Embassy, Tokyo (Oct. 23, 1997) (on file with
author). As an interim measure, the United States urged the immediate elimina-
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the Japanese government to take measures to avoid such a result'82
The EU repeated its earlier request that Japan substantially ease the
LSL.183 By arranging for opinions advocating repeal of the LSL to
be included in the Council's record, METI was able to counter the
opposition to LSL deregulation in the Council. This maneuvering
provided METI with "cover" for its decision to abolish the LSL.'&
In early December 1997, three weeks before the Joint Council
issued its interim report, the Japanese press reported that the Japa-
nese government had decided to abolish the LSL, and replace it
with a law designed to address environmental issues surrounding
the opening of new stores.185 The reporting was substantiated
when the Joint Council issued its December 24, 1997 Interim Re-
port recommending the repeal and replacement of the LSL.195
In place of the LSL, the Joint Council recommended enactment
of a new law that would shift the purpose of large store regulation
from the protection of small- and medium-sized retail stores to the
preservation of the local living environment. It further recom-
mended that responsibility for implementation of the new law be
given to local governments, under common procedures and stan-
dards set by the central government. The Report went on to out-
182 Id.
183 Cable 9568, Nov. 4,1997, supra note 175, para. 9.
184 Id.
1s Large Store Law May Be Scrapped by End of Next Fiscal Year, NtHoN KEIZAI
SHIBUN, Dec. 2,1997, translated in Cable 10373 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 2,1997) [hereinafter NIHON, Dec. 2, 1997]
(on file with author); see also Government to Scrap Large-Scale Retail Store Lao, Aim-
ing Also to Fuel Economic Growth; Restrictions on Night Operations to Be Loosened;
Hoping for Encouraged Competition Leading to Brisk Consumption, ASAHI SHIMBUN
(Dec. 3,1997), translated in Cable 10419 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter ASAHI, Dec. 3, 1997] (on file
with author) (noting U.S. pressure behind attempts to eliminate the LSL); Joint
Conference to Produce Its Final Report on tie 5th Clearly Calling for Elimination of the
Large-Scale Retail Store Law as well as for Local Governments' Store-Opening Require-
ments regarding Garbage, Noise Levels and Other Factors, ToKYo SHIMBUN, Dec. 3,
1997, at 7, translated in Cable 10419 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Dec. 3, 1997) [hereinafter TOKYO SHIMBUN, Dec. 3,1997]
(on file with author) (reporting on a Dec. Z 1997 meeting of the Joint Council).
186 JOINT CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRIB. SUBCOMM. OF THE INDUS. STRUCTURE
COUNCIL AND THE DISrRIB. SUBCOMM. OF THE SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTER.
POLICY COUNCIL, INTERM REPORT (Dec. 24,1997); see also NIHON, Dec. 2,1997, supra
note 185 (reporting the Japanese governmenfs plan to eliminate the LSL). The
Interim Report can be considered for all practical purposes a statement by METI.
In fact, the press often drew little distinction between the Joint Council and METI.
See NIHON, Dec. 2,1997, supra note 185.
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line the basic procedures that should be incorporated into the new
law. 8 7 In its Report, the Council also pointed to the need for city
planning measures that would restrict the use of land within cer-
tain areas. 88
4.1.2. METI's Decision to Abolish and Replace the LSL
After years of debate over the LSL, its end came swiftly and
with little advance notice. 89 There were arguably three primary
factors behind METI's decision to repeal the LSL: (1) dissatisfac-
tion of small retailers, as well as large retailers, with the LSL; (2)
the United States' GATS complaint in the WTO; and (3) METI's
stature as a proponent of deregulation.
Small- and medium-sized retailers were unhappy with the
number of large stores that were being allowed to open under the
LSL. They complained that the LSL was failing to protect them
adequately from large store competition.190 Since Japan had begun
easing large store regulations in 1990, there had been a nearly
three-fold increase in notifications of openings of stores with floor
space of 500 m2 or more (from 794 in JFY 1989 to 2269 in JFY
1996).'9' Also, large stores were not happy with the continued ad-
justments of the store plans; they were particularly unhappy with
187 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 11-12.
188 Id. at 9, 10. The Council also noted that because of the increased impor-
tance of developing a healthy small- and medium-sized retail industry, assistance
should be tailored to meet the industry's needs. Id. at 12,13.
189 The U.S. Embassy reported in early November 1997 that it had just
learned of METI's plans to abolish the LSL. Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note
175, para. 1.
190 Id. para. 5; ToKyo SHIMBUN, Dec. 3,1997, supra note 185, at 7; ASAHI, Dec. 3,
1997, supra note 185. The number of small- and medium-sized stores was "dwin-
dling rapidly," with the number of stores employing one to four people dropping
ten percent between 1991 and 1994. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 4. The
JCCI stressed the need to retain the LSL while strengthening the rights of local
governments to restrict large stores. In a JCCI survey, over ninety percent of the
384 Chambers of Commerce and Industry pointed to adverse consequences that
would result with the easing of the LSL. ASAHI, Dec. 3,1997, supra note 185.
'91 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 3-4; ASAHI, Dec. 3, 1997, supra note 185.
A METI survey revealed that the number of large retail store over 500 m 2 in-
creased twenty-four percent between 1994 and 1997, totaling 21,892 stores. Num-
ber of Large-Scale Stores Increased 24 Percent in 1997from 1994 Owing to Deregulation,
MITI Survey Shows, NIHON KEIZA, Apr. 21,1999, at 5, translated in Cable 3211 from
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retail space reductions.192 While some estimates set the typical re-
duction of retail space at around thirty percent,1' even according
to METI's data, floor space reduction nationwide averaged over
twenty percent, in the JFYs 1994 through 1996, for Type I stores
(3000 m2 and larger).194
The most important factor behind the repeal of the LSL was
METI's fears that it was not consistent with Japan's WTO obliga-
tions under GATS. 9-5 METI's preoccupation with the GATS case
was prevalent in its campaign to obtain support for its proposed
store regulatory -regime. METI repeatedly briefed the Council on
the status of the GATS case. It even postponed early discussions
by the Council of the future of the LSL, with hopes of having a
dearer indication of whether the United States intended to seek a
WTO panel in that dispute.196 In its Interim Report, the Joint
Council specifically drew attention to GATS' prohibition against
discrimination between domestic and foreign companies, as well as
its ban on domestic restrictions that set limits on the number of
service suppliers, by "giving consideration to economic demand,
and limiting the overall output of services." 97 The Council also
remarked upon the U.S. complaint in the WTO that the LSL and
related measures violated GATS'39
192 ASAHI, Dec. 3,1997, supra note 185; see also Japanese Retailing- Barbairians at
the Till, ECONOMIST, May 29, 1999, at 61 (citing restrictions on floor space as mak-
ing it less attractive for large retailers to conduct business in Japan).
193 ASAHI, Dec. 3,1997, supra note 185.
194 Cable 5348, June 19,1997, supra note 167, para. 3. TTI reported average
floor space reductions of 24.5% in JFY 1994 and approximately 22% in JFY 1995-96.
Id.
195 See ASSESS.mNT OF JAPAN's IMiPtLEMENTATION, supra note 159, at 2 (stating
that "senior Japanese Government officials have acknowledged that [the LSL was
repealed] because of concern that a WTO panel would very likely find the Large
Stores Law in violation of the [GATS]"), available at http://199.88.185.106/TCC
/DATA/commerce html/assoc docs/film1998.html; AsAHI, Dec. 3, 1997, supra
note 185 (citing the WTO case as one of the factors behind the decision to repeal
the LSL); see also U.S. to Claim Store Law Violates Service Agreement, supra note 162
(reporting that the government acknowledged it would have to abolish or modify
the LSL if the WTO found it violated GATS).
196 See Cable 5748, July 2,1997, supra note 168, paras. 2,9 (referring to the de-
cision in the WTO film case); Cable 9563, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 10
(noting discussions among Japanese officials seeking clarification of the status of
the WTO/GATT panels and the LSL).
'97 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 6.
193 Id. The Joint Council made no mention of the GATT case, even though by
the time it issued its Interim Report, the WTO panel had issued its Interim Report
See discussion, supra note 156.
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Outside the Council, METI repeatedly pointed to the GATS'
ban on domestic restrictions as well as the pending GATS case in
its efforts to garner support for abolishing the LSL.199 Later, in de-
scribing the new store regulatory regime, METI stressed that it
abolished the supply-demand considerations that had been at the
heart of the LSL.200 From these actions, one can concur with Dillon
that the United States' initiation of the GATS case, along with its
prolonged pendency, "pushed Japan" to abolish the LSL.201
A third but less significant factor involves METI's stature as a
deregulation proponent. METI believed it would appear "decisive
and committed to deregulation" by acting on "a high profile issue"
like the LSL.202 Also, it was reported that METI had assured the
Prime Minister and the Administrative Reform Conference
(Gyousei kaikaku kaigi) that the Ministry would alter its guidance of
industries when it was transformed into the industry ministry, as
part of the central government's reorganization in January 2001.203
The Joint Council also included a section on promoting deregula-
tion in its Report.204
These factors offer a cogent basis for repeal of the LSL; how-
ever, they do not explain why METI insisted on enactment of a re-
placement law, rather than leaving large store regulation in the
19 See, e.g., M1TI/MOC, Daikibo Kouri Tempo Ricchi Hou Ni Tsuite,
CONCERNING LARGE-SCALE RETAIL STORE LOCATION LAW 2 (Apr. 1998) [hereinafter
MITI/MOC ZONING DOCUMENT] (citing the GATS ban on "domestic restrictions
on the number of service suppliers, aimed at economic demand, and on output of
services," as well as the GATS case). METI used this document in a "propa-
ganda" role, in particular in meetings with small- and medium-sized retailers as a
means of gaining their support for METI's plans to abolish the LSL. MITI Defends
Use of Zoning Document, Cable 8591 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 4 (Oct. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Cable 8591, Oct. 23,
1998] (on file with author).
200 SECOND JOINT STATUS REPORT UNDER THE ENHANCED INITIATIVE ON
DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY 16 (May 3, 1999) [hereinafter SECOND
JOINT REPORT].
201 Dillon, supra note 164, at 237.
202 Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 5; see also NIHON, Dec. 2,
1997, supra note 185 (stating that the Japanese government had decided abolition
of the LSL was "absolutely necessary to expedite economic structural reform ad-
vocated by [then] Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto").
203 Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 5; see Chuuou shouchou-ra
kaikaku kihon hou [Central Government Basic Reform Law], Law No. 103 of 1998.
204 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 5. For example, the Council referenced
a May 1995 Cabinet Decision (Action Plan for Reform and Creation of the Eco-
nomic Structure) that called for "drastic deregulation in every sector in order to
correct Japan's high cost structure." Id.
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hands of local governments. Here, two explanations that Schoppa
offered to explain as to why METI did not abolish the LSL during
Sil would seem particularly apt Specifically, he asserted that: "To
do away with the law would mean MI would lose all of its influ-
ence over the retail sector. It would also have no way of stopping
local governments from passing even stricter regulations ...-,
Both of those reasons appear equally valid in this context.
First, as much as METI might like to portray itself as a propo-
nent of deregulation, it does not have a history of giving up juris-
diction over entire sectors. Moreover, MET! has acknowledged
that it fought to keep control of large store regulation.205 Second,
METI had long been concerned with the adoption by local gov-
ernments of stringent regulations.20 7 The United States had sought
curbs on local government regulation of large stores since the SI.;
More recently, in the Joint Council, both the U.S. government and
Keidanren expressed concerns regarding unfettered local govern-
ment regulation of large stores.209
After METI had decided on the course of the new store regime,
it worked with the LDP to address the ruling party's concerns to
ensure Diet approval of its plan. To ameliorate opposition to the
new regime, METI worked out a comprehensive package of incen-
tives and other measures.
4.1.3. Consensus-Building with the LDP
To bring its large store regulatory plans to fruition, METI had
to scale a "final wall" by gaining the support of the LDP, for whom
small retailers continued to be an influential constituency.21 0 To do
so, MET! used both positive and negative arguments related to the
international community's interest in Japan's distribution sector.
MET! emphasized that repealing the LSL "would raise Japan's in-
ternational profile as a country willing to liberalize its internal
economy, even at the expense of a politically strong yet economi-
cally vulnerable constituency."21 At the same time, the bureauc-
205 SCHOPPA, supra note 20, at 165.
206 See infra note 230 and accompanying text
207 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
2m See supra note 108 and accompanying text
209 See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
210 Cable 9568, Nov. 4,1997, supra note 175, para. 12.
211 Dillon, supra note 164, at 235.
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racy pointed out that if the United States were to prevail in its
GATS case, "Japan's international reputation for maintaining an
open domestic market would suffer."212
On December 23, 1997, the day before the Joint Council issued
its Interim Report, the LDP convened a joint conference of several
of its advisory boards to finalize its views on large store regulatory
reform.213 A number of Diet members looked at the issue through
their election lens, as they had done repeatedly. They pointed to
potential "trouble" for the LDP in the upcoming Upper House
election in July of 1998 "[ujnless something is done to wipe out the
uneasiness felt by medium- and small-size retailers" with the suc-
cessor to the LSL, including its lack of specificity.214 The Confer-
ence recognized that although the LSL (and its predecessor, the
DSL) had served for sixty years "as the central pillar for small
stores," the LSL was no longer functioning, as a result of deregula-
tion.215 The LDP conference adopted a "Resolution on Revision of
the Large-Scale Retail Store Law," in which it recognized the piv-
otal role of medium and small-size retailers in local communities
and the "severe management environment" facing them.216 It
called for reform of city planning mechanisms and measures to
revitalize distressed downtown shopping districts as a condition of
LDP support of METI's proposals.217
212 Id. The latter point was reiterated when the Secretary General of the
LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council stated his understanding that the new re-
gime proposed by METI would effectively exempt Japan from possible WTO
sanctions. LDP Position on LSRSL Reform, Cable 254 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 5 Gan. 13,1998) [hereinafter Cable 254,
Jan. 13,1998] (on file with author).
213 REPORT ON JOINT CONFERENCE OF LDP COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
SUBCOMMITTEE, MEDIUM AND SMALL-SIZE ENTERPRISES RESEARCH COUNCIL AND
DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION RESEARCH COUNCIL (Dec. 23,1997), translated in Cable
254, Jan. 13,1998, supra note 212, para. 9.
214 Id.
215 Id. It contended that most new stores are given permission automatically,
with slight reductions in floor space in some cases. Id.
216 Id. para. 10.
217 Id.; see also Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 13 (anticipating
that METI would use revitalization programs to obtain LDP's support for elimi-
nation of the LSL).
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4.1.4. Elements of Large Store Legislative Package
In early 1998, the Japanese government compiled a three-part
legislative package to replace the LSL.218 They are: (1) the Large-
Scale Retail Store Location Law (Daiten-Ricchi Ho)219 which is de-
scribed in the following Section; (2) revisions to the City Planning
Law;220 and (3) the Town Revitalization Law. ME I had laid the
foundation for these measures at meetings of the Joint Council,
and the Joint Council's Interim Report had duly recognized the
importance of these measures.=3 The City Planning Law revisions
and the Town Revitalization Law in effect compensated small re-
tailers for the protection that they were forfeiting with the repeal of
the LSL.224
On May 27, 1998 (the same day that it enacted the SLL), the
Diet amended the City Planning Law, effective in November
218 LSRSL Update and Comments on Upcoming Deregulation Talks, Cable 929
from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 4 (Feb.
5,1998) [hereinafter Cable 929, Feb. 5,1998] (on file with author); see also Editorial,
Make the Best of Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law for Dawntzon Redevelopment,
YoMIum SHIMBUN, May 30, 2000, translated in Cable 3791 from US. Embassy, To-
kyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (May 31, 2000) [hereinafter YoNHURI,
May 30, 2000] (on file with author). The bureaucracy (namely, METI and the
Ministry of Construction ("MOC")) prepared the three measures for cabinet ap-
proval in February 1998 and Diet deliberation and passage in May 1998. Cable
929, Feb. 5,1998, supra, paras. 8,11.
219 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998.
220 Toshi Keikaku Hou [City Planning Law], Law No. 100 of 1963.
221 Chushin Shigaichi Kasseika Hou [Town Revitalization Law]; Cable 929, Feb.
5,1998, supra note 218, para. 3.
222 Cable 9568, Nov. 4,1997, supra note 175, para. 13.
M INTERIM REPORT, supra note 186, at 12-13; see also Cable 9563, Nov. 4,1997,
supra note 175, para. 13 (noting that such programs would not only benefit the
LDP's small and medium-sized constituency, but it would also appeal to the
LDP's powerful construction industry supporters who would benefit from gov-
ernment funds provided for such projects).
224 Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 14 (noting that small and
medium-sized retailers seek local restrictions "to compensate for the protection
they would lose" with the repeal of the LSL); Cable 8591, Oct. 23,1998, supra note
199, para. 7 (expressing concerns with central government support of means of
undercutting "gains promised by elimination of the [LSL]"); see also MffI/MOC
ZONING DOCMENT, supra note 199 (describing how, with the legislative changes,
local jurisdictions could restrict the establishment of stores over a certain size by
creating "small to medium-size store areas").
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1998.225 The MOC had prepared the revisions to the City Planning
Law, which is under its jurisdiction. Prior to the amendment, the
City Planning Law specified twelve different "land use designated
districts." They were divided into three categories: residential,
commercial, and industrial. The City Planning Law also provided
for eleven "special-use districts" or zones, including school zones,
retail store zones, and office zones. Local governments could not
go beyond these classifications and none of the classifications
specify the size of retail business allowed in the zone. The 1998
amendments abolished the classifications of Special Land Use Dis-
tricts and authorized local governments to create their own unique
special-use zones, such as "small and medium retailer only" zones,
as well as districts in which the location of large stores will be en-
couraged.226
The Town Revitalization Law, that was developed by both
METI and MOC,227 annually provides one trillion yen (U.S.$7.7 bil-
lion) to revitalize traditional town centers.228 The funds are dis-
tributed based on proposals prepared by local governments or
other town management organizations to revitalize downtown ar-
eas.229
4.2. The Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law
4.2.1. METI's Development of Legislation
As the previous Section illustrated, METI played the com-
manding role in deciding that the LSL should be repealed and in
developing the elements of a new store regulatory system. METI
22 Toshio Aritake, Japanese Diet Approves Large-Scale Retail Store Bill, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) vol. 15, no. 22, at 951 (June 3, 1998) [hereinafter BNA, June 3,
1998].
226 Cable 929, Feb. 5,1998, supra note 218, paras. 6-8; BNA, June 3,1998, supra
note 225, at 952; MITI/MOC ZONING DOCUMENT, supra note 199, at 2-3 (detailing
the new policy measures affecting the opening of large stores). In January 2001,
MOC merged with the Ministry of Transport and two agencies to form the Land,
Infrastructure, and Transport Ministry. Cable 8723, Dec. 4, 2000, supra note 2,
para. 4.
227 Cable 929, Feb. 5,1998, supra note 218, para. 11.
228 Id. paras. 9-11; Dillon, supra note 164, at 240 n.131; BNA, June 3,1998, supra
note 224, at 952. The Joint Council discussed revitalization programs. Cable 9568,
Nov. 4,1997, supra note 175, para. 15.
229 Cable 929, Feb. 5,1998, supra note 218, para. 9; McK1NSEY STUDY, supra note
6, ch. 4, at 13.
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continued to dominate the development of the new system by first
drafting the new SLL and then the measures necessary to imple-
ment it In drafting the legislation, MET ensured that its control of
retail sector regulation would continue. First, it "fought hard to
keep the [new] Law under its jurisdiction."230 It acknowledged
that other ministries or agencies might have been involved in ad-
ministering the law,2 31 such as the MHA232 and MOC.M However,
METI continued to control large store regulation. While METI may
shun direct involvement in the regulation of large stores, it clearly
had no intention of relinquishing the authority that it had exercised
over the retail sector for sixty years.
Second, METI "deliberately" assigned to itself the development
of the implementing measures. 3 4 Also, when it drafted the legis-
lation, METI intentionally did not disclose the contents of key im-
plementing measures, in particular the standards by which large
stores would be evaluated in the new system, in order to avoid
"endless debate"2 and, one might add, challenges to its plans. By
disclosing only the broad framework of the new regime and pro-
viding no formal opportunity for public participation in drafting
the legislation, METI continued to firmly control the development
of the new regime 6
230 MITI Seeks to Reassure U.S. on New Store Law, Cable 1803 from US. Em-
bassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 3 (Mar. 10, 1993)
[hereinafter Cable 1808, Mar. 10,1998] (on file with author).
231 Id.
232 The MHA, as the ministry that oversees local government affairs, would
have had a logical claim to supervision of local governments' implementation of
the new law. The Structure of Japanese Law, Japan Bus. L. Guide (CCH), T 2-380
(1998). M-A's responsibilities include serving as the primary overseer of local
government procurement practices. Jean Heilman Grier, Japan's Implementation of
the WTO Agreement on Governnent Procurement, 17 U. PA. J. INWL ECON. L 603, 630-
31 (1996).
233 Cable 1808, Mar. 10,1998, supra note 230, para. 3. MOC, with its responsi-
bility for implementation of the City Planning Law and other land use planning
measures, would have been another reasonable choice to oversee large store
regulation.
234 Id. para. 4.
235 Id. paras. 12-13.
236 LSRSL Demarde Delivered, Cable 837 from US. Embassy, Tokyo, to US.
Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 5 (Feb. 3,1998) [hereinafter Cable 837, Feb.
3,1998] (on file with author).
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METI submitted draft legislation to the Diet on February 24,
1998.237 The Diet deliberations on the legislation were reportedly
the longest ever on legislation under METI's jurisdiction, due to its
"politically charged nature."2 Three months after METI submit-
ted the draft legislation, the Diet enacted the SLL on May 27, 1998,
without making any changes to METI's draft.239 At the same time,
the Diet abolished the LSL, with both laws becoming effective on
June 1, 2000.240
4.2.2. Provisions of the SLL
The SLL differs from the LSL in four important respects. First,
the SLL shifts the purpose of large store regulation from protection
of small and medium retailers, the raison d'etre of the LSL, to pres-
ervation of the environment in the vicinity of large stores.241 Sec-
ond, the SLL removes direct responsibility for its implementation
from METI to local governments.242 Third, the SLL prohibits local
governments from taking into account "the economic needs" of the
area surrounding a new store,243 which was allowed under the
LSL, and limits consideration of the opening of large stores to fac-
tors related to the preservation of the environment in the vicinity
237 New Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law Passes Diet, Cable 4003 from U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 2 (May 27, 1998)
(on file with author).
m The Lower House deliberated twenty-two hours and the Upper House
eighteen hours. Id.
239 The Lower House passed the large store legislation on May 8, 1998 and
the Upper House followed suit on May 27,1998. Id. It was officially promulgated
on June 3, 1998. METI's drafting of the legislation typified the legislative process
in Japan, where ministries draft between seventy-five to ninety-five percent of all
legislation passed by the Diet, and the Diet makes minimal substantive changes.
RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 12, at 29.
240 MITI's LSRSLL Transition Period to "Freeze" Large Store Openings, Cable 834
from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 4 (Feb.
2,1999) (on file with author).
241 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 1; Large Stores Law, Law No.
109 of 1973, art. 1. Both laws set out a general purpose of fostering the sound de-
velopment of the retailing sector and the national economy. Id.
242 The SLL places the authority for the establishment and expansion of all
large stores covered by the Law in the hands of forty-nine local governments
(forty-seven prefectures and twelve Designated Cities). Store Location Law, Law
No. 91 of 1998, art. 5. Under the LSL, local governments had authority only for
stores with retail space of between 1000 m2 and 3000 m2. Cable 1808, Mar. 10,
1998, supra note 230, para. 6.
243 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 13.
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of the new store.244 Fourth, the SLL only allows local governments
to recommend adjustments by developers,245 in sharp contrast to
LSL which authorized METI and local governments to compel
large retailers to make adjustments to address competitive con-
cerns of local retailers.246
The SLL requires store developers 247 to submit a notification
(todokede) to prefectural governments or Designated Cities243
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "prefectures") at least eight
months before establishing or expanding a new large store249 with
retail space exceeding 1000 m 2.250 The SLL directs = to "estab-
244 Id. art. 4.
245 Id. art. 9.
246 See Large Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art. 8 (authorizing the Minister
of International Trade and Industry or the Prefectural Governor to delay the
opening date of the store or to order a reduction in floor space); see also Cable
1808, Mar. 10,1998, supra note 230, para. 10 (noting that under the LSL new store
owners could be ordered to make changes to their plans but such an order would
not be authorized under the SLL).
247 Under the SLL, only developers of large stores are required to file a notifi-
cation. Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1993, art. 5. This is unlike the LSL,
which also required retailers in the proposed building to file notifications. Large
Stores Law, Law No. 109 of 1973, art. 5. The SLL allows prefectures to require re-
tailers operating businesses in large stores to submit reports but only to the least
extent necessary for implementation of the SLL. Store Location Law, Law No. 91
of 1998, art. 14. A Cabinet Order limits that information to the opening date of the
retail business, its location, retail floor space, and business operation methods.
Daikibo kouri tempo ricchi hou shikourei [Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law En-
forcement Ordinance], Cabinet Order No. 327 of 1998, art. 4"2 (Oct. 16, 1993)
[hereinafter SLL Cabinet Order].
248 SLL responsibilities assigned to prefectural governments are to be per-
formed by Designated Cities where a new store is within a Designated City's ju-
risdiction. Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 15. These are cities with
populations over 500,000, designated by Cabinet Order, pursuant to the aihou
Jichi Hou [Local Autonomy Law], Law No. 67 of 1974, as amended [hereinafter Lo-
cal Autonomy Law].
249 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 5. The notification must in-
dude the following information on the planned store: (1) name and address, de-
veloper and retailers; (2) opening date; (3) total floor space; (4) location and ca-
pacity or size of its facilities (parking lots, loading and unloading facilities, and
garbage handling facilities); and (5) operations, including business hours (opening
and dosing times), hours of operation of parking and delivery facilities, and
number and location of parking entrances and exits. Id. art. 5:1(3)-(4); Daibo
kouri tempo ricchi hou shikou kisou [Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law En-
forcement Rules], METI Ordinance No. 62 of June 10, 1999, revised by Ordinance
No. 91 of Nov. 6,1999, art. 3 [hereinafter SLL Ministerial Ordinance]. METI has
also prescribed the documents that must be attached to the notification. Id. art 4.
250 SLL Cabinet Order, Cabinet Order No. 327 of 1998, art. 2 (pursuant to Ar-
ticle 3:1 of the SLL). "Retail space" excludes bars and restaurants but includes
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lish and publish guidelines" that large store developers are to con-
sider25' and that prefectures are to use in presenting opinions25 2
and recommendations to store developers.25 3
Within two months of filing the notification, the developer
generally must hold at least one explanation meeting254 to describe
its store plans to the public.255 The submission of a notification
triggers a four-month public review process that enables interested
parties to submit their views on measures they believe the devel-
oper should take to preserve the environment.2% Interested parties
include local residents, businesses, Chambers of Commerce and
Industry, and other industry associations and cities governing the
store site.25 7
Within eight months of the notification, the prefectural gov-
ernment must provide the developer with its opinion on the store
plans, after it considers the views of local governments and the
establishments engaged in product processing and repair services. Store Location
Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 2:1. Prefectural governors can raise the threshold
for stores in a specific district to the extent necessary and sufficient to maintain the
living environment. Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 3:2.
251 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 4:1.
252 Id. art. 8:4.
253 Id. art 9:1; see MITI DISTRIBLrION INDUSTRY DIVISION, OUTLINE OF 'DAITEN-
RICCHi Ho' 4 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter MITI OUTLINE]; SECOND JOINT REPORT, supra
note 200, at 17.
24 SLL Ministerial Ordinance, METI Ordinance No. 62 of June 10, 1999, re-
vised by Ordinance No. 91 of Nov. 6, 1999, arts. 3, 11:1. If the prefecture expects
the location of the store to have a significant environmental impact, it may require
the developer to hold as many as (but no more than) three explanation meetings.
Id. A prefectural governor may determine that an explanation meeting is not nec-
essary and instead require the developer to post a notice summarizing the notifi-
cation on the store site. Id. art. 11:2. This is a significant departure from the prac-
tice under the LSL where as many as fifteen to twenty explanation meetings could
be required. MITI Seeks Comments on Draft LSRSLL Ministerial Ordinance, Cable
5812, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 10 (July
15,1999) [hereinafter Cable 5812, July 15,1999] (on file with author).
255 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 7:1. Public notice must be
given at least one week before the briefing. Id. art. 7:2. In setting the date and
place for the briefing, the developer must consult with local governments. Id. art.
7:3.
256 Id. arts. 8:1, 8:2. The prefecture then must make public a summary of
these views for one month. Id. art. 8:3.
257 METI has emphasized the importance of hearing the views of "a wide va-
riety of interested parties in order to ensure appropriate operation of the law,"
whether individuals or groups. MITI OUTLINE, supra note 253, at 6.
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public.2 If the prefecture has no views on the plans, the process
ends and the developer may proceed with its store plans z 9 How-
ever, when a prefecture provides comments on the impact of the
store on the neighboring environment, the developer must submit
a Voluntary Coordination Plan indicating whether or not it intends
to change its original plans to address the concems.7hu For the fol-
lowing two months, the developer may not open the store. If the
prefecture finds the developer's Plan sufficient to protect the envi-
ronment, the developer can proceed.262
If the developer and the prefecture do not reach agreement on
an adjustment of the plans in the two months after the developer
submits its Voluntary Coordination Plan, the prefecture may issue
a recommendation (kankoku) to the developer to modify its store
plans. However, before doing so, the prefecture must determine
that the Voluntary Coordination Plan will have a significantly ad-
verse effect on the environment in the vicinity of the store and that
it fails to duly reflect the prefecture's views. METI has indicated
that the types of recommendations prefectures can make include:
(1) the need to provide adequate parking spaces or facilities to
avoid traffic jams; (2) the location of store entrances and exits to
avoid obstruction of the flow of customers to and from nearby
shopping districts; and (3) sufficient guards to prevent customers
from causing traffic jams.264
253 Id. art. 8:4. The prefecture must make its views public for one month. Id.
8:6. The Ordinance prescribes additional details, including publication of the
views of prefectures. SLL Ministerial Ordinance, MMlT Ordinance No. 62 of June
10,1999, revised by Ordinance No. 91 of Nov. 6,1999, arts. 5,14,15,17.
259 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 8:5.
260 Id. art. 8:7; see also MITT OUTuNE, supra note 253, at 5 (flow-charting and
explaining articles 5-9 of the SLL).
261 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 8:9.
262 Id. art. 8; M1TI OUruNE, supra note 253, atS.
263 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 9:1. The prefecture must
make its recommendation within two months of the submission of the Voluntary
Coordination Plan, and the recommendation must be made public. Id. arts. 9:1,
9:3. Before making a recommendation, the prefecture must hear the views of the
city with jurisdiction over the proposed store site. Id. art. 9:1; see also MIT1 Ex-
plains "Location Law" to U.S. Retail Firms, Cable 988 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 14 (Feb. 8, 2000) [hereinafter Cable
988, Feb. 8, 2000] (on file with author).
264 MTT OuTIUNE, supra note 253, at 2.
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A developer may respond in one of two ways to the prefec-
ture's recommendation. The developer can modify its plans265 or
ignore the recommendation and proceed with the store opening.
The local government can inform the public that the developer has
no justifiable reason for not following the recommendation. 266 Pre-
fectures may not convert their recommendations to an order, as
under the LSL. Moreover, the store-opening process cannot be
halted, even if a developer ignores a local government's recom-
mendation, as long as the developer has complied with the proce-
dures set out in the SLL.267 The processing period, from the sub-
mission of the notification to the presentation of views by local
governments, is set for eight months. Assuming that there are no
disputes, the developer may proceed with its store plans. Even if
there are disputes, processing should not exceed twelve months,
which includes time for the developer to prepare a Voluntary Co-
ordination Plan and for the local government to prepare its rec-
ommendation.268
4.3. Environmental Guideline
4.3.1. METI"s Development of the Guideline
METI retained extensive discretion in determining the guide-
lines by which new large stores will be evaluated, which is a key
element in SLL implementation. The SLL only directs generally
that the guidelines address matters related to the arrangement of
store facilities and store operations, including the convenience of
265 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 9:4; see also MITI OUTLINE, SU-
pra note 251, at 5 (explaining articles 5-9 of the SLL).
266 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 9:7; Cable 988, Feb. 8, 2000,
supra note 263, para. 15; Cable 1808, Mar. 10,1998, supra note 230, para. 10.
267 Cable 988, Feb. 8,2000, supra note 263, para. 22.
268 MITI OUTLINE, supra note 253, at 5 (providing a flowchart for the operation
of articles 5-9 of SLL; indicating how long each step of processing takes); Cable
988, Feb. 8, 2000, supra note 263, para. 15; see also Cable 1808, Mar. 10, 1998, supra
note 230, para. 7 (noting that the new law shortens the processing period from
twelve to ten months). After a large store has opened, it is subject to certain obli-
gations when it changes facilities or business operations that affect the environ-
ment. See Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 6; see also MITI OUTLINE,
supra note 253, at 6 ("After the opening of large scale retail stores.., a store
opener has to undergo the procedures [of the SLL] again when it changes store
facilities or business operations which affect the living environment except for
minor changes."); SLL Cabinet Order, Cabinet Order No. 327 of 1998, art. 4 (de-
tailing conditions under which prefecture can require developer to report).
[22:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss1/1
JAPANESE REGULATION OF LARGE STORES
local residents and neighboring commercial enterprises, such as
sufficient parking facilities and the prevention of the deterioration
of the environment due to noise and other factors.269 It is an im-
provement over the LSL, which provided no guidance or standards
as to when a proposed store might have a significant impact on
nearby small- and medium-sized retailers and thus trigger de-
mands for adjustments to the store plans. ,0
METI's development of the guidelines with the Joint Distribu-
tion Council coincided with moves by the Japanese bureaucracy to
address criticisms of its rulemaking process. Japanese ministries
and agencies were criticized for generally formulating regulations
in a "black box", with little, if any, advance public notice or public
participation.2"' The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act has re-
quired such advance notice and public input for more than fifty
years.272 To address these deficiencies in its regulatory system, in
March 1999, the Cabinet adopted a "Public Comment Procedure"
that became effective April 1, 1999.mr3 Also, METI adopted a trial
269 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 4:2(2).
270 Id. art. 7; see also Cable 9568, Nov. 4, 1997, supra note 175, para. 5 (noting
dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in the review process under the LSL).
2n 1998 NTE, supra note 158, at 202. The Administrative Reform Conference
(Gyousei kaikaku kaigi) in its December 1997 report to the Prime Minister had also
recommended that Japan adopt a notice and comment process. See Jean Heilman
Grier, Is Japan's Regulatory System Becoming More Transparent and Accountable?, in
THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON JAPANESE INFORMIATION IN SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, EDUCATION AND COIWERE 5 (Stockholm, Swed., Sept. 1999) [here-
inafter GRIER STOCKHOui CONFERENCE PAPER] (on file with author).
272 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 US.C. 553 (1994). When Japan enacted
an Administrative Procedure Law in 1993, it did not include rulemaking provi-
sions. Kodderitzsch, supra note 79, at 115.
273 Kisei no settei matawa kaihai ni kakaru iken slwoai telsuzukd [Public Comment
Procedure], Cabinet Decision of Mar. 23, 1999. The Procedure requires central
government administrative entities (gyousei kikan) to give notice to the public of
proposed regulations, to provide an opportunity for the public to submit com-
ments on them, and to take the comments into consideration when they prepare
the final regulation; agencies to which the Procedure applies include the Cabinet,
the Prime Minister's Office, ministries, agencies, commissions (iinkai-ka), and their
subdivisions. Id. § 1 n.5. Regulations covered by the Procedure include cabinet
orders (seirei), ordinances of the Prime Minister's Office tret), ministerial ordi-
nances (shoret), and notifications (kokuji). Id. § 1 rL2. For an elaboration of the de-
velopment and content of the Procedure, see GRIER STOCKOLM CONFERNCE
PAPER, supra note 271, at 7-25.
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policy that generally requires its advisory councils to use a "notice
and comment" process.274
The U.S. Government pressed METI to allow interested parties
to participate in the Joint Council's development of the environ-
mental guidelines and other implementing measures.275 METI re-
fused to bring the Joint Council's development of the SLL guide-
lines under its new advisory council policy.276 It also resisted
applying the new Public Comment Procedure. METI eventually
relented in discussions with the United States under the Enhanced
Initiative.277 It agreed "to facilitate the consistent, transparent, and
predictable application" of the SLL by, inter alia, using the Public
Comment Procedure in developing the Guideline, ministerial ordi-
nances, additional cabinet orders, and other measures to imple-
ment the SLL.278
In accord with METI's commitment, the Joint Council solicited
public comments on the draft guidelines, as well as on an ex-
planatory document that laid out the rationale for the SLL and the
Council's recommendations. 279 Even though over 100 parties, in-
274 MITI Contemplates Introducing a Limited Notice and Comment Process into
Policymaking, Cable 7076 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C., para. 5 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Cable 7076, Sept. 2, 1998] (on file
with author); see MITI, PABURIKKU COMENTO SEIDO No DOUNYUU Ni TsuiTE
[INTRODUCTION OF A PUBLIC COMMENT SYSTEM] (Aug. 10,1998).
275 SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF JAPAN REGARDING DEREGULATION, COMPETITION POLICY, AND TRANSPARENCY AND
OTHER GOVERNMENT PRACTICES IN JAPAN 36 (Oct. 7,1998) (setting Japan's adoption
of a public comment process as a priority in talks under the Enhanced Initiative
on Deregulation and Competition Policy) [hereinafter SUBMISSION BY THE
GOVERNMENT, Oct. 7, 1998]. Because the United States had little opportunity for
input into the development of the SLL, it was particularly insistent that Japan al-
low public input into its guideline development process. Cable 837, Feb. 3, 1998,
supra note 236, paras. 3,5.
276 Cable 7076, Sept. 2,1998, supra note 274, para. 2.
277 ENHANCED INITIATIVE, supra note 126.
V8 See SECOND JOINT REPORT, supra note 200, at 17. Earlier, the Cabinet had
issued an Order setting the threshold for the Law's coverage at 1000 m 2 in retail
space. SLL Cabinet Order, Cabinet Order No. 327 of 1998, art. 4.
279 See MITI Seeks Comments on Draft LSRSLL Guidelines, Cable 3631 from U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 2 (May 7, 1999)
(on file with author). It set a thirty-day comment period for both documents, until
May 20, 1999. Id. Later, the Joint Council solicited public comments on a draft
ministerial ordinance implementing various provisions of the SLL. Cable 5812,
July 15,1999, supra note 254.
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cluding the U.S. Government280 and foreign and domestic retailers,
submitted detailed comments on the drafts, METI and the Joint
Council finalized the guidelines and explanatory documentm only
days after the public comment period ended. They made only mi-
nor changes in both documents. This led the United States to
charge that METI's treatment of the public comments "call[ed] into
question the credibility of the public comment process."282 METI's
actions suggest that its use of the Public Comment Procedure was
"only a pro finma exercise in which the outcome (the final regula-
tion) is predetermined."283
4.3.2. Content of the Guideline
On June 30,1999, METI adopted a "Guideline Related to Items
that Should Be Taken into Consideration by Persons Who Establish
Large-Scale Retail Stores" ("Guideline").284 It provides detailed
standards in four areas: parking, traffic, noise, and waste disposal.
The Guideline sets out responsibilities of store developers, as well
as "the basis" on which prefectures and local residents are to
evaluate proposed large stores 8
Traffic and Parking. With regard to traffic and parking, the
Guideline addresses the need for a store developer to avoid, or at
least alleviate, inconveniencing local residents and businesses as a
result of increased traffic that will follow the opening of a new
store.286 To that end, the Guideline directs developers to address
290 USTR, SUBMISSION OF COMMENTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN'S GUIDELINE FSrABLISHED UNDER THE LARGE-SCALE
RETAIL STORE LOCATION LAW (DArrEN-RccHI Ho) 6, 7 (May 20, 1999) [hereinafter
U.S. CoNrzmTS ON GUIDELINE].
2m JOINT COUNCIL, DAIVJBO KoUmi TEMPo RiccHl Hou DAt 410 NO SHISHIN (An)
NO SAKUTEI NI ATFATE [ESTABLISHMENT OF GUIDELINE IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE LARGE-
SCALE RETAIL STORE LOCATION LAW] (May 31,1999).
2m2 USTR, AccEss TO JAPAN'S PHOTOGRAPFC FILMN AND PAPER MIART: REPOrT
ON JAPAN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS WTO REPRESENTATIONS 6 (June 9,1999); se also
GRIER STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE PAPER, supra note 273, at 22-24 (noting that the
shortcomings in the public comment procedures may undermine their effective-
ness).
2M3 GRIER STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE PAPER, supra note 273, at 13.
234 METI, DAYsBo KoupJ TEMPO OSETCHI SURU MOuO GA HAIRYO-SUBEKI1O Iw
KANSURU SHIsHiN [GUIDELINE RELATED TO ITEMS THAT SHOULD BE TMhEN INTO
CONSIDERATION BY PERSONS WHO ESTABLISH LARGE-SCAtE RETAIL STO,%ES], Notice
(Kokuji) No. 375 of June 30,1999 [hereinafter GUIDELINE].
m9 Id. at 1.
2M Id. at 3.
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five issues: (1) automobile parking spaces; 28 7 (2) location and
structure of parking lots;288 (3) parking spaces for bicycles;289 (4) fa-
cilities for delivery vehicles;290 and (5) appropriate routes for access
to the store.291 Developers are to provide parking spaces sufficient
to meet a store's most crowded one-hour peak of the year.292 The
Guideline also sets out the formula and assumptions that develop-
ers should use to calculate the parking spaces that will be
needed.293 Where due to "special conditions" use of the formula
would not be appropriate, other calculation methods may be used
if the developer provides "a clear rationale" based on data from
similar stores.294
In addition to providing sufficient parking spaces, developers
must take measures to prevent a queue of automobiles waiting for
a parking space. They can do so by adjusting the number and lo-
cation of entrances and exits to parking facilities or providing an
area on the store premises for automobiles to wait for a parking
space. Other options include dispersing parking locations, as-
signing employees to direct traffic into the parking facilities, and
separating paths for automobiles and pedestrians.293 Developers
are expected to select from the measures in the Guideline "in a ra-
tional manner."296
Noise. The Guideline requires developers, in cooperation with
their retail tenants, to take appropriate measures to prevent or al-
leviate noise that accompanies the location or operation of a large
2W7 Id. at 4-7.
2M Id. at 7-9.
289 Id. at 9-10. Store developers are to provide bicycle parking to meet a one-
hour peak. Because the parking spaces needed for bicycles will vary significantly
from store to store, the Guideline concluded that it would be inappropriate to es-
tablish a uniform standard. Id. at 10.
290 Id. at 10-11.
291 Id. at 11-13.
292 Id. at 4.
293 Id. at 4-7.
294 Id. at 4. "Special conditions" include stores of a special nature such as
furniture stores where the number of daily customers is expected to be lower than
the typical store and areas in which the use of cars is excessively low or high. Id.
at 4-5.
295 See id. at 7-9. Additional parking and traffic measures that developers are
to take include measures to prevent delivery trucks from causing traffic conges-
tion around the store and to establish appropriate routes for access to a store, such
as maps to parking lots. Id. at 10-12.
296 See id. at 7,11.
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store. They are to take into account the type of noise, where and
when it is generated, the conditions of the surrounding area, and
existing laws and regulations.297 Developers are to consider noise
when they select store facilities and decide on their location.2 The
Guideline also lists specific measures that may be taken to alleviate
noise generated by store deliveries, 99 public relations and adver-
tising activities,3 00 facilities attached to the store; 0' and waste col-
lectiorn.M
Developers must select the measures that they intend to take to
prevent or alleviate noise. Then, they must estimate three types of
noise that will be generated by the new store and evaluate whether
the measures they have selected will be appropriate. Three noise
categories exist (1) fixed noise that remains at a constant level
over time (e.g., freezers and air conditioning and ventilation
equipment); (2) fluctuating noise (e.g., cars within a store's lot,
idling of delivery trucks and waste collection); and (3) shock noise
(noise of a short duration resulting from such activities as pushing
handcarts). 3m The Guideline prescribes estimation and evaluation
methods that developers are to use, unless special factors make
such methods inappropriate. In such cases, the developer can use
another method for which he can provide a rationale304
The Guideline requires developers to make efforts to keep the
overall noise levels below standard levels set out in the Environ-
mental Agency's Environmental Noise Standard.313 With respect
297 Id. at14.
2M0 Id. at 14. For example, they should not face facilities and equipment to-
ward residential areas. Id.
299 Id. at 15. The measures include construction-related measures, such as
"using noise-free materials for floors and walls" of the delivery facility, and
measures related to store operations, such as prohibiting delivery vehicles from
idling. Id.
300 Id. Measures include the placement and volume of loudspeakers. Id.
301 Id. at 15-17. To alleviate noise from freezers, air conditioners, and ventila-
tion equipment, developers may use low-noise equipment and installation of
walls. To address noise from parking lots, developers may consider construction
of enclosed parking facilities. Id. at 16.
3M2 Id. at 17.
303 See id. at 17-18.
304 See id. at 18-19. The Guideline also prescribes where noise measurements
are to be taken. Id. at 19.
305 See id. at 19-20. The standard referred to is the Environmental Quality
Standard for Noise, Environmental Agency Notification No. 64 of SepL 30, 1993,
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to "night-time" noise resulting from store operations and the use of
its facilities and equipment, developers are to attempt to keep the
noise levels below the "Regulated Night-Time Standards under the
Noise Prevention Law." 30 6
Waste. The waste provisions in the Guideline apply to the stor-
age, transportation, and disposal of waste produced by the retail
establishments operating within a store.3w7 Developers must cal-
culate waste storage capacity using the calculation formula set out
in the Guideline. The three categories of waste for which they
must make calculations are paper, cans and bottles, and garbage
and other types of waste. The calculations will also depend upon
the type of retail store generating the waste; that is, general, cloth-
ing, food, or housing and consumer goods.308 As with the other
environmental factors, the Guideline also identifies measures de-
velopers should consider. These include the frequent collection of
waste and the selection of proper garbage collectors.309
The Guideline requires store developers to provide the results
of, as well as the basis for, estimations that they use to determine
parking lot space, loading and unloading facilities, noise preven-
tion measures, and garbage-handling facilities. They must make
estimates using "rational" methods.310
4.3.3. Critique of the Guideline
The Guideline generated severe comments from both the U.S.
Government and the European Commission ("EC"). Both com-
mented to METI that the Guideline appears to convert the SLL
from a notification system to an approval system. It does so by re-
quiring developers to conduct extensive research and prepare ex-
tensive documentation to prove, before they open a large store,
available at http://www.eic.or.jp/eanet/en/lar/regulation/noise.html; GUIDE-
LINE, supra note 284, at 19.
306 GUIDELINE, supra note 284, at 21. Where the noise estimation is taken at a
site that does not have an area designation under the Noise Prevention Law, de-
velopers are to consult with prefectural governments and assume area designa-
tion for their stores. Id. at 21-22.
307 Id. at 22.
308 See id. at 22-26. Additional waste considerations include the placement
and structure of the waste disposal facility. Id. at 26-27.
309 See id. at 27. The Guideline also requires developers to follow local waste
disposal laws and local regulations in disposing of garbage. Id. at 22.
310 Cable 988, Feb. 8,2000, supra note 263, para. 12.
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that such a store will meet the standards in the Guideline?" The
United States argued that stores should be allowed to respond to
environmental problems that arise after they open.312
The United States also raised the concern that the Guideline
imposes obligations on store developers that exceed existing legal
requirements and that do not have to be met by existing stores and
other types of commercial enterprises?' 3 METI responded that the
Guideline is intended to impose higher standards for parkdng,
noise, and waste on new stores than those which already exist 314
The solicitation of public comments on the draft Guideline and
ministerial ordinance increased the transparency of the process,
even though METI treatment of the public comments did not sig-
nificantly improve the public's input into the final Guideline. In-
terested parties could only complain to METI about its conduct
concerning the rulemaking process, as there is no basis in Japanese
law for judicial review of rulemaking procedures. Since the Cabi-
net adopted the Public Comment Procedure as an administrative
measure (a Cabinet decision), it is not reviewable under Japan's
Administrative Case Litigation Act. 15
311 U.S. COMiMENNTS ON GUIDELINE, supra note 280, at 5. EUROPEAN Comz., EU
CoNmmS ON THE DRAFT OF A GUIDELINE TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW LARGE
SCALE RErAIL STORE LOCATION LAW, ARTICLE 4, 2 (May 1999) (pointing to the "sig-
nificant amount of ex ante information to accompany a notification"); see also MITI
Responds to Embassy's Retail Store Guidelines Questions, Cable 818 from U.S. Em-
bassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., para. 12 (May 13,1999) (on
file with author) (stating that the process set out in the Guideline "establishes a de
facto approval system").
312 U.S. COMIrNTS ON GUIDELINE, supra note 280, at 5. The United States
pointed out that the draft Ministerial Ordinance underscored concerns that the
new large-store opening process may create a de facto prior evaluation system
rather than an ex post facto verification system. SUBMISSION OF COMMENTS BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE JAPANESE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INDUSTRY'S PROPOSED MINISTERIAL ORDINANCE UNDER THE DAniz-
RPccH Ho 1 (uly 30,1999).
313 See U.S. COMiENTS ON GUIDELINE, supra note 280, at 5-6 (citing the noise
provisions as an example of such requirements). According to the United States,
based on its discussions with the Japanese Environmental Agency, the "require-
ment that large store openers research and estimate potential noise levels is
unique... [olther large facilities-such as bowling alleys, parking garages, and
even most factories-are not required to do the same." Cable 5812, July 15,1999,
supra note 254, para. 15.
314 See MITI Clarifies Thinking Concerning USG Comments on LSRSLL Draft
Guideline, Cable 836 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C., para. 13 (May 28,1999) (on file with author).
315 See Gyousei jiken sosho hou [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No.
139 of 1962, as amended.
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4.4. Local Government Implementation of the SLL
This Section considers the apprehensions surrounding local
government implementation of the new SLL, the constraints on lo-
cal governments, as well as METI's authority to ensure compliance
with the new SLL.
4.4.1. Apprehensions Regarding Implementation of the SLL
The provisions of the SLL have been described as seemingly
"innocuous."316 However, sixty years of experience with Japan's
protection of the economic interests of small retailers through
regulation of large stores have left their mark. There is deep skep-
ticism regarding the SLL. Large retailers have two principal con-
cerns. First, they fear the potential abuse of the SLL to continue
protecting the business interests of small- and medium-sized re-
tailers under the guise of environmental protection. Second, they
are concerned with the inconsistent application of the new SLL by
local governments across Japan, and the adoption of more strin-
gent local measures. 317
These concerns were fueled by local government preparations
of local ordinances to carry out their new responsibilities under the
SLL. Extensive press reporting pointed to a number of potential
problems with the ordinances.318 These include standards that are
316 Maki Hishikawa, Tokyo Takes on Superstores -Again, AsIAN WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8,2000, at 12.
317 Cable 988, Feb. 8, 2000, supra note 263, para. 6; see 1998 NTE, supra note
158, at 201.
318 Aim of Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law Becoming Blurrj, with Local Gov-
ernments Set to Introduce Own Stricter Environmental Regulations on Large Store
Openings; Shaking the Framework of Uniform Application Across the Nation, NIHON
KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Feb. 2, 2000, at 1, translated in Cable 845 from U.S. Embassy, To-
kyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Feb. 2, 2000) (on file with author);
Distributors to Face Difficulty Under Large-Scale Retail Store Location Lao to Be En-
acted in July; More Time Needed for Coordination with Local Community, Leading to
Raising Store-Opening Costs, Retail Prices, YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Jan. 26, 2000, at 9,
translated in Cable 690 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C. Gan. 27, 2000) (on file with author); Uncertainty Looming About De-
regulation; Even Advocates Bewildered by Emerging Markets; Moves Afoot to Protect
Local Communities, JR Local Lines Operating in the Red, and Quiet Downtown Areas,
ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 30, 2000, at 14 [hereinafter Uncertainty Looming], translated in
Cable 2410 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C., at
2 (Apr. 2000) (on file with author).
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stricter than METI's Guideline,319 requirement of prior consulta-
tions before a notification is filed,370 and higher costs because of
extensive documentation requirements.321 There are also fears that
local governments would not be able to resist the pressures from
local retailers to curtail large store competition.32 Reassurances by
METI that the SLL will make it easier to open new stores have not
been alleviated the concerns. 323
4.4.2. Constraints on Autlwriy of Local Governments Under the
SLL
The question of whether the fears of large retailers were un-
founded will depend, at least in part, on the ability of the central
government to ensure proper implementation of the SLL by local
governments. Japan's unitary system authorized local legislatures
to enact their own ordinances (jorei) and chief executive officers of
local governments to issue regulations (kisoku), "so long as they are
not contrary to the laws enacted by the Diet" or the orders of the
national government.324 While the Japanese Constitution generally
recognizes "the principle of local autonomy" 323 and the right of lo-
cal governments "to manage their property, affairs, and admini-
stration,"326 in fact, most "important items of local government are
regulated by national statutes."327
319 See, e.g., Uncertainty Looming, supra note 318, at 14 (discussing the need for
deregulation).
320 Application-Rush Among Large Store Operators for Permission to Extend Store
Hours, Aiming at Fait Accompli Before Enforcement of New Legislation, NHON KEZA!
SHIMBUN, Apr. 20, 2000, at 3 (reporting that most prefectures would require prior
consultations before submitting a notification), translated in Cable 2935 from U.S.
Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Apr. 24, 2000) (on file
with author); LSRSLL: Fukuoka Gearing up for Implementation, Cable 95 from US.
Consulate, Fukuoka, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 11, 2000) (on
file with author).
321 Fukuoka Developer Sees Higher Costs, No Improvements in the Law, Cable 41
from U.S. Consulate, Fukuoka, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Feb. 18,
2000) (on file with author).
322 See Hishikawa, supra note 316.
323 Id.
324 KENP6 [Constitution], art. 94 (Japan); THE JAPANESE LEGAL SySmi 37, 57
(Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).
325 Kme6 [Constitution], art. 92 (Japan).
326 KENF6 [Constitution], art 94 (Japan).
327 THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 324, at 44; see also Local Autonomy
Law, Law No. 67 of 1974, art. 14.
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As a national statute regulating local government, the SLL both
gives authority to and takes authority from local governments.
Enactment of the SLL gives local governments exclusive authority
to review store plans and then make recommendations. At the
same time, the SLL ostensibly curbs local authority in three im-
portant ways.
First, the SLL restricts local governments' review of large store
plans and recommendations to developers with respect to envi-
ronmental factors, based on METI's environmental Guideline.328
Second and more important, the SLL prohibits local govern-
ments from taking into account "the economic needs" of a par-
ticular area in evaluating proposed stores plans.3 29 METI says this
means: "Local governments ... cannot use any supply/demand
adjustment mechanism."33 ° This provision is the counterpart of the
repeal of the LSL and is intended to ensure that Japan is not again
vulnerable to claims of violating its GATS obligations. Third, local
governments cannot stop a store from opening. At the end of the
process, all a local government can do is to recommend adjust-
ments to a developer in the interest of preserving the environment.
If the developer ignores the recommendation, the local government
lacks the authority to compel the adjustment or halt the project.331
The effectiveness of these formal constraints on local governments
will depend on the ability of the central government, namely
METI, to ensure compliance.
4.4.3. METI's Authority over Local Governments
To ensure that the local jurisdictions do not use the SLL and
other measures to "unfairly restrict competition by large retailers,"
the U.S. government asked METI, inter alia, to retain authority
over local governments. Specifically, the United States urged
328 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, arts. 8:4, 9:1; see also SECOND JOINT
REPORT, supra note 200, at 17 (stating that MITI will "closely monitor local gov-
ernments' implementation of the Law").
329 Store Location Law, Law No. 91 of 1998, art. 13; see also MITI OUTLINE, su-
pra note 253, at 2 (explaining that the new law aims at "maintaining the living en-
vironment of areas within the vicinity of large scale retail stores"); SECOND JOINT
REPORT, supra note 200, at 16 (stating that Japan enacted the SLL "from the view-
point of abolishing supply/demand adjustment concerning the opening and op-
erating of large-scale retail stores and preserving the living environment sur-
rounding such stores").
330 MITI OUTLINE, supra note 253, at 5.
331 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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METI to establish a formal process at the central government level
for hearing and acting on retailers' complaints if local governments
unreasonably restrict large retail stores.3 2 METI would only com-
mit to "[take appropriate measures, as necessary, based on the Lo-
cal Autonomy Law, including giving technical advice and recom-
mendations to local governments, to facilitate resolution of
complaints from any interested party regarding the application of
the Law."3
While the central government may intervene if local govern-
ments do not act in accord with national law, its ability to do so is
circumscribed by the Local Autonomy Law.4 That Law author-
izes the central government to make recommendations to a local
government that is not appropriately complying with a law."
Only in exceptional cases is the Prime Minister authorized to take
more forceful action. 6 Under the Local Autonomy Law, METI, as
the drafter of the SLL, assumes responsibility for its implementa-
tion.337 However, METI has said that central government inter-
vention in local government SLL implementation would not be
preemptive; it would only be made after a local government im-
properly makes a commercial adjustment.s
METI has contended that only Yokohama and Sendai have
adopted standards that are more stringent than its Guideline?9
For example, Yokohama City, on April 11, 2000, introduced an
"Implementation Outline" for the SLL that set parking standards
for large stores, located within 100 meters of a train station, and
with retail space of 20,000 m2, at 660 parking spaces, significantly
332 SUBMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT, Oct. 7,1998, supra note 275, at 36.
3 SEcONDJOINT REPORT, supra note 200, at 17. In response to the US. request
that the Japanese government establish a dispute settlement process, MITI estab-
lished nine contact points- one in its headquarters in Tokyo and one in each of its
eight regional bureaus-"to receive and facilitate resolution of complaints from
any interested party regarding the application of the Law." Id.; see also Cable 938,
Feb. 8, 2000, supra note 263 (noting that METI would establish contact points to
ensure uniform enforcement of the SLL).
334 Local Autonomy Law, Law No. 67 of 1974, art. 14(1); Cable 837, Feb. 3,
1998, supra note 236; THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 324, at 57.
335 Local Autonomy Law, Law No. 67 of 1974.
3M Id.
337 Cable 837, Feb. 3,1998, supra note 236, para. 8.
3M Id.
339 Yokohama Introduces Large Store "Outline," Cable 3148 from U.S. Embassy,
Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (May 2,2000) [hereinafter Cable
3148, May 2,2000] (on file with author).
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greater than the 242 parking places prescribed by the Guideline.340
In both the Yokohama and Sendai cases, METI claimed that, after
scrutiny and discussions with the governments, the Ministry had
concluded that their measures were within the latitude of local
governments under the Guideline.341 As to other local measures
that the press reported to be inconsistent with METI's Guideline or
procedures, METI asserted that they were merely voluntary.342
METI has stated that should local governments establish stan-
dards that are stricter than those in the Guideline, "[METI] has the
responsibility to clarify such standards and ensure that they do not
go beyond the requirements of the national law."343 In several in-
stances, METI requested changes in local government implement-
ing materials.3
METI reportedly told small- and medium-sized retailers that
the new regulatory regime would make store openings more diffi-
cult and would allow them to restrict the operations of large
stores.345 A survey in June 1998 revealed that nearly thirty percent
of the surveyed municipalities planned to establish special zoning
areas that would enable them to decide whether or not to allow
large retail stores and over eleven percent planned to restrict the
opening of large stores. 346
Under the Ramseyer and Rosenbluth thesis, an important ele-
ment in determining the latitude that METI will allow local gov-
ernments in their application of the new SLL will depend upon the
LDP. Before the Lower House election in July 2000, in which the
340 Id.; see also Yokohama City to Set up Own Standards for Application of Large-
Size Store Location Law; First Case Among Local Governments Throughout the Nation;
Much Stricter Standard for Capacity of Parking Lots, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Apr. 11,
2000, at 5, translated in Cable 2608 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Apr. 11, 2000) (on file with author).
341 Cable 3148, May 2,2000, supra note 339, para. 11.
342 Id. para. 13.
343 Cable 988, Feb. 8, 2000, supra note 263, para. 19.
344 Three days before the June 1, 2000 implementation of the SLL, METI re-
quested three local governments (Fukuoka Prefecture, Kumamoto Prefecture, and
Fukuoka City) to make certain changes to their store opening manuals. LSRLL:
Kyushu Local Governments Perplexed by MITI's Last-Minute Changes to Store-Opening
Manuals, Cable 109 from U.S. Consulate, Fukuoka, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Wash., D.C. (June 14,2000) (on file with author).
345 Zoning Law: Soft Underbelly of New Large Store Restriction Regime?, Cable
6236 from U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Aug. 6,
1998) (on file with author).
346 BNA, June 3,1998, supra note 225, at 951.
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LDP suffered heavy losses in urban areas, conservative elements of
the Party had indicated that they wanted to re-examine large store
regulation (with the suggestion that they might tighten it).U7 Late
in 1999, a group of LDP politicians created a "Committee to Recon-
sider Deregulation", which is "calling for revisions in government-
sponsored deregulation programs."3 48 By March 2000, this Com-
mittee had grown to around 165 members, slightly less than half of
the LDP's total membership in the Diet. They are concerned with
the impact of deregulation on small business, in particular with
"complaints from small retailers about increased competition from
supermarkets and discount stores."349 As the LDP prepares for the
upcoming July 2001 election in the Upper House, which the LDP
does not control, the Party can be expected to continue to give
close attention to the interests of its small retailer constituencys0 It
remains to be seen whether the LDP will seek measures that would
increase its electoral support among consumers in urban areas.
Consumers are generally more concerned with lower prices and
convenient shopping than with protecting the country's "mom and
pop" stores. If the LDP's reliance on the small business constitu-
ency were to soften, one could expect that METI would assume a
less tolerant attitude toward recalcitrant local governments that
regulate large stores too stringently.
5. CONCLUSION
For sixty years, METI (and its predecessors) has regulated large
retail stores. It initially opposed the enactment of the first law, the
DSL, out of concern that such a law would impede modernization
of the retail sector. When the politicians insisted on measures to
protect their important small retail constituency, METI took the
initiative to design and implement the regulation. This became its
modus operandi. When called upon by the politicians to impose
regulations in order to protect small retailers from their large com-
petitors, METI willingly, even willfully, designed stringent regu-
latory measures.
347 LDP Activating Move to Call for Review of thw Government's Deregulation
Plan, SANKEI SHIMBUN, Feb. 14, 2000, at 2, translated in Cable 1116 from US. Em-
bassy, Tokyo, to U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Wash., D.C. (Feb. 14,2000) (on file with
author).
348 Mulgan, supra note 7, at 42.
349 Id.
35 Id. at 43.
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When the DSL had outlived its usefulness, METI devised the
LSL as a means of liberalizing store regulation by moving from the
permit system of the DSL to a notification system. However, the
Ministry was forced to retreat from this liberalization movement
and add an adjustment process that became the bane of large re-
tailers. When the LSL failed to satisfy small retailers, METI dem-
onstrated the zeal that it could bring to regulation in the interest of
placating the important LDP constituency. It did not hesitate to re-
sort to administrative guidance that exceeded the strictures of the
law, and effectively delegated LSL authority to the players, thus
"privatizing" large store regulation. METI's response to large store
regulation, as discussed above, fits the Ramseyer and Rosenbluth
model of bureaucrats who "faithfully implement LDP policy pref-
erences" out of self-interest.3 51
When Japan was faced with the threat of a finding that the LSL
violated its international trade obligations in the WTO, METI or-
chestrated and firmly controlled the LSL's repeal and replacement.
METI used the deliberations of its advisory council as a cover to
put before the public its new store regulatory proposal. It per-
suaded the LDP and small retailers to accept the new SLL by de-
veloping an attractive legislative package, which included funds
for the revitalization of downtown shopping areas and authority
for local governments to develop zones from which large stores
could be excluded.
The new SLL placed the day-to-day responsibility for large
store regulation in the hands of local governments. However,
METI incorporated constraints on local governments. It limited its
scrutiny of new stores to environmental factors and prohibited
consideration of an area's "economic needs." Accordingly, local
governments cannot consider the impact of a new store on local
retailers. Nor can local governments, under the SLL, halt the
opening of a store that has complied with the procedures in the
Law or force a developer to adjust its store plans.
METI determined the details of the new regulatory regime. It
reluctantly increased the transparency of, and accepted public
comments on, the measures it adopted to implement the SLL.
However, these moves had little effect on the final measures.
On its face, the SLL appears to be a major improvement over
the LSL from the perspective of large retailers. However, from
351 RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 12, at 12-13.
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their long experience with the LSL, large retailers are skeptical re-
garding how the new SLL will be implemented. Their skepticism
is based on two primary fears. First, they fear local governments
will use environmental protection as a guise for protecting the local
retailers. Second, they are concerned with inconsistent application
of the SLL by local governments. Such an application would ren-
der the store-opening process more difficult and burdensome. In
addition, because of the sensitive relationship between the central
government and local governments, large retailers are uncertain as
to whether and how METI will respond if a local government in-
appropriately impedes the opening of a new store.
METI has been cagey regarding the new regulatory regime. It
has sought to reassure large retailers that the local governments
will properly follow the SLL and promised to monitor their activi-
ties and help resolve complaints. But, when two local govern-
ments (Yokohama and Sendai) developed local measures that were
regarded as more stringent than the SLL, METI found justifications
for them. Moreover, it was METI that put together the three-part
store regulatory package that "could be used indirectly by small
stores to limit the business operations of their prospective large
store competitors." 35 2
While METI has been the mastermind and primary mover be-
hind this latest regulatory policy, the politicians must not be for-
gotten. If small retailers become unhappy with the new store
regulations, the LDP may have little choice but to demand that
METI tighten the regulations. Another side of the political equa-
tion is the role of the consumers who are more concerned with
lower prices and convenient shopping than with protecting the
country's "mom and pop" stores. In light of the LDP's severe
losses in urban areas in the June 2000 Lower House election, it re-
mains to be seen whether the LDP will take a more lenient stance
toward large stores as a means of garnering the support of the ur-
ban voters in future elections, including in the Upper House elec-
tion in July 2001.
For these reasons, at this time, the new SLL appears to be
"much less of an unequivocal victory for retail market liberaliza-
352 Cable 929, Feb. 5, 1998, supra note 218, para. 4; see also YOm:URI, May 30,
2000, supra note 218 (explaining that, while ME was doing away with the statute
explicitly designed to protect small retailers, each of the new three-part regulatory
laws could be used to the small retailers' advantage in minimizing the impact
from large store competition on their own operations).
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tion than was originally thought."353 However, it is too early in its
implementation to reach a firm conclusion. Given the low produc-
tivity of Japan's retail sector, which is pulled down by the "mom
and pop" stores, it would be in Japan's overall interest to reduce
the inefficiencies in the small retailing sector and promote large
stores. But it remains to be seen whether the traditional forces for
the protection of small retailers will prevail over liberalization pro-
ponents concerned with the overall health of the retail sector.
353 YOMIuRi, May 30, 2000, supra note 218, at 45.
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